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Due Process in Practice
or
Whatever's Fair
By ANN FAGAN GINGER*
TnIS article is an attempt to define due process in such a way that
the practicing lawyer can use due process concepts more often and
more effectively.
Due process is approached from many angles: by giving examples
of its recent successful use, by taking a look at its historical roots, by
listing due process questions requiring answers, and finally by attempt-
ing to formulate a comprehensive guide to the elements of due proc-
ess.
I have tried to follow Mark Twain's advice, eschewing broad,
flexible words and phrases like "fair trial," "fundamental decency,"
"civilized conduct," and "reasonableness." I have tried to place in per-
spective the Supreme Court's memorable but short-lived rule that de-
nials of due process only occurred when the conscience of the Court
was shocked.-
* A.B., 1945, LL.B., 1947, University of Michigan; IL.M., 1960, University
of California, Boalt Hall School of Law. Adjunct faculty member at University of
California, Hastings College of the Law; University of San Francisco School of Law;
and Santa Clara School of Law. President, Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute,
Berkeley, California.
I want to acknowledge with thanks the assistance and co-operative criticism of
Richard Derevan, Stanton Brunner, and Kathleen Walz of the Hastings Law Journal on
the Advocate's Guide, and of John McCulloch of Boalt Hall and Thomas Ginger of
the University of Mississippi School of Law on the article as a whole. I also want
to express my appreciation to the Lillian Boehm Foundation for helping to underwrite
the experimental seminar on Due Process at the University of San Francisco School
of Law in the fall of 1973, which stimulated completion of this article. (See text ac-
companying note 209 infra.)
© Ann Fagan Ginger and the Hastings Law Journal 1974.
1. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (stomach pumping of a crim-
inally-accused). This test was rejected by the Court at least by 1954 in Irvine v. Cali-
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The approach here is to start at the beginning and get to the
end of due process by asking and answering a series of questions:
How important is due process? What is its scope? Who cares about
it? How does it work in practice? What does it mean? What can a
practitioner do with it? What are the sources of due process? What
are its limits? And what does it amount to today? One by-product
of this approach is a consideration of standards of fairness that do not
achieve constitutional stature but are required by statute or by private
agreement.
The crux of this article is the Draft of an Advocate's Compre-
hensive Guide to Due Process Requirements and Standards of Fair-
ness, with Citations. Work on the guide leads to the suggestion that
due process merits separate consideration in the law school curriculum.
How Important Is Due Process?
Substantive law questions tend to receive priority treatment from
many in the legal profession. Law students, new lawyers, and civil law
clients 2 often want to win on the merits. But the lawyer preparing
an extensive memo on substantive issues may have to stop in mid-
stream to face a realistic alternative. He or she3 may discover that
it is possible to win without reaching the merits by insisting on a pro-
cedural requirement which the other side has not provided and either
will not or cannot provide. On the other hand, students entering law
school from the exact sciences, or those intrigued with game theory,
fornia, 347 U.S. 128, 133-34, 138 (1954).
This, and virtually all other citations in the notes and Advocate's Guide, pp. 937-
959 infra, are suggestive rather than exhaustive. They are intended only as starting
points for further research on specific topics, and, due to time limitations, do not in-
clude many important opinions, articles, and statutes. This article is part of a larger
work in progress that will contain much fuller annotation.
2. Clients charged with customary crimes are likely to accept whatever approach
looks promising, whether substantive or procedural, although defendants charged with
so-called political crimes, such as contempt of Congress, may insist on a particular de-
fense. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961) (First Amendment
right to refuse to answer questions regarding political beliefs and affiliations).
3. Since no ear-satisfying solution to the gender problem has come to my atten-
tion so far, in this article I have continued to use "he" to mean "he or she" when
I felt the reader would remember that women were included in the pronoun "he."
Where possible I have used "one" or repeated the noun. It is hoped that the sex of
the author, and some qualities in the text, will remind the reader that both sexes are
included in the pronoun "he." For some quick, sharp insights into this general prob-
lem, see M. BARD, WOMAN AS FORCE IN ISTORY: A STUDy IN TRADrTIONS AND REAL-
ry (1946).
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may turn too quickly to procedural issues, or approach problems with
too much assurance that pure logic will prevail.4
A feeling for procedure, and the role it actually plays in the law,
seems to be an acquired taste. It often leads to concern for fair proce-
dures, including those that can be framed in terms of due process.
While many judges,5 lawyers,6 legislators," and scholars," have written
about due process with feeling, its full significance seems to have
eluded even some constitutional experts.9
4. Some law students even see the law as a giant slot machine into which one
has only to put the right combination of facts and precedents to achieve the desired
result. See Frank, Scientific Training, in LAw AND Tnm MODERN MnD 100 (1930);
Dawley, Black People Don't Have Legal Problems, in Tim RELEvANT LAWYERs 219,
220 (A. Ginger ed. 1972). Compare Justice Holmes' statement: "The law embodies
the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt
with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics."
O.W. HOLMES, Tan COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
5. Justice Cardozo, for instance, probably coined the most useful and enduring
phrase, with his "scheme of ordered liberty" in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937). Justice Brandeis pointed out that "in the development of our liberty in-
sistence upon procedural regularity has been a large factor." Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465, 477 (1921) (dissenting opinion). Justice Frankfurter believed that
"Etlhe history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure."
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945). Justice Jackson maintained that
"[tihe most odious of all oppressions are those which mask as justice," in Krulewitch
v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 458 (1949), and pointed out that "due process of law
is not for the sole benefit of an accused. It is the best insurance for the Government
itself against those blunders which leave lasting stains on a system of justice but which
are bound to occur on ex parte consideration." Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
Justice Douglas' views on the importance of due process are found in his opinion
in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 178 (1951) (con-
curring opinion), among many other writings. Justice Stewart expressed his concern
about basic fairness in Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410 (1970) (concerning a
Selective Service registrant), and in Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
385 U.S. 276 (1966) (concerning a deportee).
Virtually every opinion cited in the Advocate's Guide, pp. 937-959 infra, contains
some expression of the significance of due process.
6. See, for example, briefs raising due process questions at all levels in state
and federal courts described in MEnmw.JoHN LmRARY AcQuisrrboNs, vols. 1-6 (1968-
1974), and on file in Meiklejobn Civil Liberties Institute, Berkeley, California.
7. See, e.g., SENATE Comm. ON Ta JuDIciAnY, Sumcomm. ON CoNsnrONA.
RIGHTS, Monthly Staff Reports.
8. Articles on due process have become so numerous that, since 1952, due proc-
ess has received separate treatment in the IDrwnx TO LEGA. PERIODICI.S.
9. Professor Thomas Emerson's 754 page treatise, THE SYSTEM OF FEmOM OF
EXPRESsION (1970), contains only one index reference to the whole field of due proc-
ess. He and co-authors David Haber and Norman Dorsen managed to shine much
light on the First Amendment and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment without discussing, as a distinct subject, their intimate relationship with
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This article is the culmination of close scrutiny of constitutional
litigation during the past twenty years. During this period the Warren
Court began considering a series of convictions obtained by procedures
that allegedly denied due process. In reversing many of these convic-
tions,1" the Court issued opinions describing the history of procedural
protections, thus sharply increasing awareness of their fundamental
character.
Since lawyers are usually needed to raise due process issues ef-
fectively, the Warren Court virtually insured that many would be
raised when it ruled that indigent criminal defendants are entitled to
the assistance of counsel. 1 Congress, two presidents, the states, and
private organizations underwrote this assurance by establishing public
defender programs for indigent criminal defendants, 2 and by adding
OEO legal service programs," pro bono publico projects,' 4 and staff
counsel for indigent plaintiffs in civil litigation.'15 This assurance was
strengthened by statutes and decisions"6 awarding attorney's fees to
plaintiffs winning public law cases.
During this period, 1953-1969, thousands of parties filed suits
alleging that they had been denied their civil liberties, civil rights, or
due process of law in state and federal courts and agencies. Eighty-
two hundred such cases were collected and as the history of this liti-
gation was recorded,' 7 it slowly became obvious that First Amend-
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in POLITICAL AND
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1967).
10. See citations to United States Supreme Court decisions handed down in 1953-
1969, 346 U.S. to 394 U.S., in the Advocate's Guide, pp. 937-959 infra.
11. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1973).
12. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3006A(b), 3006A(h)(2) (A) (1970).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2809(a)(3) (1967).
14, See, e.g., ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON PRO BONO PUBLICO ACTIVITIES, PRO BONO
REPORT.
15. See the development in group legal services from the opinion in NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), through United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State
Bar, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) to United Transportation Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576
(1971). See also CALIFORNIA STATE BAR, RULES ON GROUP PRACTICE 20, 23.
Poverty lawyers today may gain some perspective from a seminal article detailing
the differences in procedures and sanctions available to business institutions from those
available to indigent litigants and labor organizations in 1947, by Olshausen, Rich and
Poor in Civil Procedure, 9 SCIENCE & SOCIETY 11 (1947).
16. E.g., Blankenship v. Boyle, 337 F. Supp. 296 (D.D.C. 1972); Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), e-5(k) (1964). See also the statutes and cases collected
in M. DERFNER, ATTORNEY'S FEES IN PRO BONO PUBLICO CASES: A COMPILATION OF
FEDERAL COURT CASES (Supp. I, Aug. 1972; Supp. II, Feb. 1973; Supp. III, Mar. 1974).
17. See I-XIV, CIVIL LIBERTIES DOCKET (A. Ginger ed. 1955-1969) [hereinafter
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ment/free speech cases were won quite often on Fifth Amendment/
due process grounds,' 8 and that Fifth Amendment due process and
Fourteenth Amendment/equal protection were closely related. 19 On
reflection, this was not surprising because the scope of the due process
clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments has undergone al-
most constant expansion since the Reconstruction Period, and has im-
pinged upon the First Amendment protection of liberty and upon the
Fourteenth Amendment protection of equality.
What is the Scope of the Due Process Clauses?
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment was originally
a limitation on the power of the federal government to make decisions
affecting the life, liberty, and property of persons within its jurisdic-
tion. The government could only act according to customary proce-
dures recognized by lawyers, judges, and to a considerable extent by
people who used the courts to settle their disputes.
The general limitations on government procedures contained in
the Fifth Amendment due process clause were complemented by spec-
ific limitations on the power of the federal government contained in
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments, and by
the ex post facto, bill of attainder, and habeas corpus provisions in
the Constitution itself.20 These limitations are often called procedural
cited as DocKET]. This work was published several times a year from 1955 through
1965, and once a year thereafter through 1969, by National Lawyers Guild and later
Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Library.
18. See, for example, Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963), in which
the defendant was convicted of contempt of Congress for refusing to answer questions
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities solely on First Amendment
grounds (that the Committee had no authority to ask the questions since it could not
legislate in the area of political thought). The Court reversed, ruling that the Commit-
tee had acted unfairly by violating its own rules and permitting a staff member to de-
cide to deny the requested executive session. And compare the basis for reversing
Smith Act convictions in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), with the basis
for affirming earlier Smith Act convictions in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951).
The Court also used strict statutory construction with overtones of due process
to decide in favor of First Amendment claimants when a different construction would
have endangered liberty. E.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958) (denial
of passports for refusal to answer questions on political beliefs held violative of ad-
ministrative regulations).
19. "TMhe concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from
our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive . . . . [d]is.crimination
may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 499 (1954). See text accompanying notes 189-201 infra.
20. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
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because they prescribe the way the government must try a case. For
example, under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant must be
permitted to subpoena witnesses in his behalf.
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
treated originally as being parallel to the Fifth Amendment due proc-
ess clause. It was a limitation on the power of state governments to
make decisions affecting the life, liberty, and property of persons
within their jurisdiction.
When the several states and Congress began enlarging the scope
of government involvement in economic affairs, a private contract con-
cerning a freight rate became subject to government regulation21 under
the commerce clause, and a private contract between a miner and a
mining company became subject to state regulation22 under the police
power. The test of the validity of such economic legislation was
whether there could be some rational basis for it.2" If so, it did not
constitute a taking of property without due process of law as forbidden
by the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
This use of the due process clauses clearly covered substance, not
form, and greatly expanded the concept.
The Supreme Court also held that the Fourteenth Amendment
due process clause included the First Amendment protection against
state government interference with political freedom.24 This interpre-
tation included a substantive feature, as well as procedural protec-
tions. Freedom of speech, press, religion, association, and petition
are rights of substance. One protection on which they rely is the pro-
hibition against prior restraint on their exercise.
Later the Warren Court added to the due process clause of the
Fourteenth virtually all of the specific guarantees contained in the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments.25 Simultaneously the
Fifth Amendment due process clause was expanded to include the
concept of equal protection.
2 6
The result of all of these constitutional changes-by adoption of
the Reconstruction Amendments, and thereafter by interpretation and
incorporation-is that the lines between the separate protections of
liberty (in the First Amendment), equality (in the equal protection
21. Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
22. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
23. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
24. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), and its progeny.
25. See Advocate's Guide, pp. 937-959 infra, and note 136 infra.
26. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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clause of the Fourteenth), and fairness (in due process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth) have become blurred. Both liberty and fair-
ness now are protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth,
while equality and fairness are protected by the due process clause
of the Fifth. Yet some lines do remain and may be useful. The
Court, and the public, continue to think of due process as distinct
from equal protection. First Amendment liberties remain distinct
from due process protections, even if both are now part of the Four-
teenth Amendment due process clause.
All of these protections in our present constitutional system, of
course, cover only those activities in which one can find governmental
action. Public relationships must provide due process. With a large
civil service, plus innumerable subcontractors, licensees, and recipients
of government funding or insurance, 27 the scope of due process protec-
tions is enormous.
In addition, private citizens who go to court to enforce their pri-
vate contracts or to straighten out their private affairs (e.g., through
bankruptcy or divorce) bring themselves within the due process re-
quirements. A court cannot reach a decision which deprives one of
them of property without following due process procedures. Neither
will a court issue a decision enforcing the terms of a private contract
if the terms are unconscionable.28
Due process guarantees have had an impact far beyond the limits
of "state action." The constitutions and by-laws of most private volun-
tary associations include some of the protections included in the Four-
teenth Amendment due process clause, although few include the en-
tire list.29  Members of most voluntary associations assume that deci-
sions in their organizations will be made in a "fair" manner, particu-/
larly those disciplining or expelling members.
The public, however, continues to think about due process most
27. The telling phrase from an early housing desegregation case seems apposite
here: "[When one dips one's hands into the Federal Treasury, a little democracy nec-
essarily clings to whatever is withdrawn." Ming v. Horgan, 3 RAcE RELATIONS L. REP.
693, 697 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County 1958). See note 28 infra.
28. E.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965), and common law cases cited therein; UNIFoRm COMMERCIAL CoDE § 2-302 (as
to sale transactions). The analogy with Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), on
the unenforceability of contracts violating equal protection, is suggestive. See Skilton
& Helstad, Protection of the Installment Buyer of Goods under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 65 MIcH. L. Rnv. 1465, 1475 (1967) (due process for buyers).
29. E.g., attorneys are forbidden to participate in hearings in some international
trade unions. See OMCE & PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES INT'L UNION CONST., art. XIV,
§ 2 f (1971).
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often in terms of fairness in criminal procedures. The universal re-
liance on due process is demonstrated repeatedly in the criminal cases
involving the former Attorney General of the United States, another
former Cabinet member, and other former White House aides. An
intrigued nation observes that the pretrial defense motions filed in
United States v. Mitchell & Stans'0 are remarkably similar to those
filed by one of Mitchell's targets, former consultant to the Department
of Defense, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg (in successfully defending against
charges based on publication of the so-called "Pentagon Papers")3,
and by black Communist philosophy instructor Angela Davis (in suc-
essfully defending against charges of kidnapping, murder, and conspir-
acy).
32
The Watergate investigations have focused attention, not only on
criminal procedures, but on the need for fairness in noncriminal pro-
cedures. Questions are being raised about how the executive branch
makes decisions on appointments to government office, on prosecu-
tions for antitrust and tax violations, on conducting political campaigns,
on conflicts of interest, and on the extent of permissible violations
of the right of privacy. These are, in part, problems of government
in dealing with Americans on issues of life, liberty, and property and
require standards for action. They raise due process problems.33
30. One example is the motion for change of venue to Aberdeen, Mississippi,
because of the impossibility of obtaining an unbiased petit jury in New York City
or in other urban areas. San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 13, 1973, at 3, col. 1. Another
example is the requests for postponements and subpoenas of government tapes. New
York Times, Oct. 24, 1973, at 30, col. 1.
Professor Charles Nesson of Harvard Law School, one of the attorneys for Dr.
Daniel Ellsberg, has reported queries from lawyers for E. Howard Hunt, Jr., and
former Vice President Spiro Agnew concerning Ellsberg case motions regarding prose-
cutorial misconduct and grand jury investigations. New York Times, Oct. 30, 1973,
at 33, cols. 1-2.
31. United States v. Russo & Ellsberg, Criminal No. 9373-CD-WMB (C.D. Cal.
1973). The docket sheets and all documents filed during pretrial are in the complete
case collection filed in Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute, Berkeley, California.
32. People v. Davis & Magee, Criminal No. 3744 (Super. Ct. Main County
1972); People v. Davis, Criminal No. 52613 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County 1972).
See also the register of actions, docket sheets, and all documents filed during pretrial
in complete case collection in Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute, Berkeley, California.
33. Our existing due process requirements do not provide any (or adequate)
standards for such decisions, and it is now abundantly clear that these decisions cannot
be left to the good judgment or ethical principles that happen to be possessed by the
decision-makers in a particular administration. See, e.g., Fine, The Politics of Justice,
59 A.B.A.J. 1422 (Dec. 1973); Lewis, Government Lawyers and Conscience, 59
A.B.A.J. 1420 (Dec. 1973).
This nation and its citizens are, today, at a different point in history from the
1930's when an increasing number of decisions began to be made in administrative
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25
The Warren Court opinions on due process, the Watergate inves-
tigations and the resulting proposals for impeachment of the presi-
dent34 have made due process a current topic for lawyers. But that
is only one reason for its timeliness. In a developing country with
an expanding gross national product and unmeasured natural re-
sources, many problems and procedures do not require close scrutiny
or government action. Should land be sown in cotton or corn?
Whichever grows better or brings the higher price. Should it reap
orange groves or subdivisions? No matter, thtre's more land to the
West. But when the affluence is gone, how are scarce resources to
be allocated? What parties have interests so basic that they must be
permitted to participate in the decision-making? Should the govern-
ment step in? If so, what facts must it obtain in order to set standards?
Who can be required to divulge them? What standards are to be used
in deciding who gets what, when, and in what quantities, and for what
prices? Who is to administer the standards? And what appellate
body should review allegations of unfairness in the procedures for set-
ting the standards, unfairness in the standards themselves, or unfair-
ness in their administration? These due process problems emerge
daily from the headlines, whether of wheat exports, fuel shortages,
or Main Street redevelopment.
On the individual level, in times of economic expansion due proc-
ess may go unnoticed and its denial unlitigated. If a worker is dis-
charged from a position but can get a similar or better position with
no difficulty, he or she may suffer little monetary loss. When it was
customary in the society to move from job to job or from place to
place, the discharge may not have created major problems for the
worker or his family. Even if the worker felt that the discharge was
unfair, he may not have sought redress, due process concepts being
largely unknown to laymen and litigation seldom considered as a rem-
agencies, outside the litigation process. We have lived through a world war, costly
in human casualties, in order to defeat a triumverate of powers (Germany, Italy and
Japan) operating under a governmental-economic system characterized as fascist, in
which executive-administrative-military decisions wiped out all popular participation in
government and all independent legislative and judicial power and permitted a return
to bestiality in highly civilized countries, including Germany's virtual extermination of
its Jewish, left-progressive and Communist population. We have observed a series of
coups in other traditional democracies (most recently in Chile) leading to absolute
power in the executive-military branches. We are ripe for discussion on due process
requirements in the executive branch (not just in administrative agencies covered by
the Administrative Procedure Act), but that issue is beyond the scope of this article.
34. See, e.g., A asxcw CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WHY PRBsrDENT RIcHARD
NXON SHOULD BE IMPEACHED (Public Affairs Press, 1973).
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edy for an unfair discharge.3 5
On the other hand, in a period of tight economics, due process
problems must be faced repeatedly. If a public employee loses a posi-
tion and cannot easily find a similar one in the community, he or she
cannot assume one will be found "further West." The worker may
want to challenge the fairness of the discharge, the absence of prior
notice of unacceptable performance, the lack of standards of perform-
ance for all workers, the absence or inadequacy of the hearing on the
discharge, and the lack of impartial judgment on his performance. An
employee in private industry may seek to prove that due process re-
quirements apply to him or her because the firm has government con-
tracts, or that the discharge violates state law or a provision in the
union contract with management. If the discharged worker is a mem-
ber of a minority group that has difficulty finding employment, or is
a woman, he or she may raise due process questions in addition to
allegations that equal protection was denied. 6
Who Cares About Due Process?
Due process concepts, then, are not the exclusive concern or pos-
session of the legal profession. If they were, it would be impossible
to convince a client to sue on such grounds, or to win a case tried
to a jury or before a lay administrator. Lawyers know that to convince
a jury requires the reframing of due process issues in language con-
vincing to nonlawyers. Reference to the Golden Rule may be more
convincing to one juror than an appeal to the Fourteenth Amendment,
and reference to the by-laws of a trade union or fraternal association
37
may convince another. A rule of conduct found in Emily Post's guide
35. Many Americans today think the existence of the frontier until around 1890
meant that "Going West" was an acceptable alternative to staying put and seeking re-
dress of grievances. For support of this thesis, see J. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (1920). Of course, trade unions fought many grievances during
the latter part of the nineteenth century, but relied largely on strikes and direct action,
turning to the courts only to defend against injunctions, contempt citations, and for
other defensive relief. See generally P. FONER, I-IV HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES (1947).
36. See, e.g., Brooks v. School Dist., 267 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 894 (1959). See also the series of cases of black teachers dismissed by Southern
schools in the wake of decisions desegregating students, collected in DOCKET, supra note
17, at § 571.
37. However, the inadequate acceptance of due process concepts, even by officials
of an organization concerned with civil liberties, is recorded in THE TRIAL OF ELIZA-
BETH GURLEY FLYNN BY THE AMERICAN Civu. LIBETns UNION (Lamont ed. 1968),
concerning the hearing leading to expulsion of a charter member and national board
member of ACLU.
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to etiquette, "Dear Abby's" column, Aesop's fables, or black history
may convince someone who would be untouched by the weight of the
Anglo-American concept of ordered liberty.
While trial lawyers are well aware of this reality, legal writers
seldom cite nonacademic sources as authorities, whether folk wis-
dom, mother wit, or common experiences, 8 although ethical concepts
from religious sources are occasionally cited.39  Due process must rest
on nonlegal, as well as legal foundations if it is to continue to play
a meaningful role in fact-finding and decision-making processes in a
society in which nonlawyers hold many important posts and, as voters,
are supposed to run the government. 40  Due process is also benefitted
by cross-fertilization from other disciplines.41
38. A blind political science professor and lawyer has explained that, while his
seminal article on The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts
is "amply flecked with footnotes, citing a wide range of formal materials," he believes
that "[tlhe views expressed . . . are verified by his personal experience as a disabled
individual far more than by all the footnote references put together." tenBroek, 54
CALiF. L. REv. 841, n. $ (1966). See also a loning law professor's discussion of a legal
problem raised by his personal habits, in Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding
Citizens, 75 YALE L.. 1161 (1966), without any footnote citations to other authority.
39. See, for example, reference to work by a religious scholar on morals in the
majority opinion upholding an immunity act in Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,
426-27, n.2 (1955). The dissenting opinion in the same case concerns confessions ex-
tracted under compulsion of oath being against the laws of both God and man. Id.
at 448 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also the Biblical quotation on treatment of rich
and poor in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 n.10 (1956).
40. See, e.g., A. MEmLEJOuu, POLTcL FREuoM: Tm CoNsTrruTIoNAL Pow-
ERs oF THE PEOPLE (1960).
At this point the confused reader is entitled to a note concerning the plan for
this article. The apparent mixture of apples and oranges is by design. Moreover, the
mixture is really of apples, paperclips, and fertilizer. In other words, along with
Holmes, Llewellyn, and Frank (although with no pretensions to their expertise or wis-
dom), I feel that law is a unified whole including both "the law" found in horn books
and "the law" as practiced; I am attempting to cover both bases here. Along with
others who have spent years doing nitty gritty work, I enter discussions on theory look-
ing for specific answers to specific questions, such as who will listen to a due process
question and when. Along with some older and many younger lawyers, I feel that
it is helpful to admit that one cannot turn off one's private self when one reaches
the office, and that experiences from either side of life can often be used in the other
to the benefit of both. This explains some of the authorities cited here.
41. Law schools now encourage interdisciplinary work in some specialties, e.g.,
joint degree programs in law and business administration, library science, and social
work, and inter-disciplinary journals such as Yale Review of Law and Social Action,
Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, Center for Responsive Psychology: So-
cial Action and the Law. And see organizations like the American Society for Political
and Legal Philosophy (for philosophers, political scientists, and lawyers. Samuel M.
Davis argues that psychiatrists should join law professors in teaching subjects like the
insanity defense. Davis, Psychological Functions in the Teaching of Criminal Law,
44 Miss. LJ. 647 (1973).
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The lawyer seeking nonlegal analogies for any due process argu-
ment has little difficulty in this sports and family oriented society. A
nonfan has plenty of time to observe the deep concern with violations
of the rules in competitive sports. Parents observe the same phe-
nomenon when they overhear their children, of all ages, at play.
Every club or gang seems to haggle endlessly over procedures for ex-
clusion and inclusion, and over penalties for violation of the oath of
group membership. Parents learn that appeals to fairness may prove
more successful than appeals to other basic principles, such as the right
to be different (freedom of expression) or to be treated the same
(equal protection).
4 2
In the recent heyday of the Youth Cult, parents heard long argu-
ments suddenly concluded by someone yielding his position with a
shrug and a new pop phrase. "Whatever's fair" became the standard
for settling disputes, and it was quickly welcomed by the beleaguered
parents.
"Whatever's fair" may be as useful a phrase for laymen as "due
process" is for lawyers to describe the goal of fairness in procedures.
Both laymen and lawyers assume that the community has standards
of fairness that must be considered. With this in mind, Justice Frank-
furter attempted to define due process as "those canons of decency
and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking
peoples,"43 and later further expressed this concept of due process de-
nials as those actions that "offend the community's sense of fair play
and decency."44
How Does Due Process Work in Practice?
The nation recently witnessed an exciting example of the growth
of concern about basic fairness and due process in a field of law touch-
ing a broad spectrum of society. The universality of the Selective Ser-
vice obligation required both lawyers and clients to understand the sig-
nificance of due process, and suggested that they convince prosecutors
42. For example, my sons and their preschool age friends accepted, without too
much grumbling, the rule in our house, that in playing cops and robbers, no one could
be shot until he had received some kind of trial. Occasionally the trial then became
the game.
43. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945) (concurring opinion).
The definition is limited to due process standards for criminal cases by the final
phrase: "notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with
the most heinous offenses." Id. (emphasis added).
44. This is one of many well-turned definitional phrases in Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
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and judges that it must be provided from the beginning to the end
of each draft case.
Until the escalation of the Vietnam War and objections to it, a
handful of experts in draft law handled most of the cases arising
around the country. They used some due process ideas from crim-
inal law, such as the right to inspect FBI reports,45 and did some broad
work on statutory definitions, i.e., standards for exemption (such as
for "conscientious objectors").46 But they made little use of the statu-
tory requirement of "fairness" in Selective Service proceedings, 47 rely-
ing instead on intimate knowledge of the specific regulations issued
by Selective Service and on other sources of law which were largely
inaccessible to the bar as a whole (such as unreported opinions).48
Their clients were largely from Jehovah's Witnesses and a few other
religious groups, and these tactics won many victories for the clients,
both in unreported verdicts after trials and in some reported opin-
ions.
4 9
As United States involvement in Vietnam escalated, increasing
numbers of young men from many religious and nonreligious back-
grounds sought classifications other than I-A. As a result, increasing
numbers of general practitioners found themselves struggling with
draft law problems. (Even when they referred all other cases to so-
called specialists, they often had to deal with their own sons and
nephews.) For the first time, a significant segment of the bar discov-
ered that registrants were explicitly forbidden the assistance of counsel
at local board hearings on their applications for classifications other
than I-A,50 that no standards for such classifications were spelled out
in the Code of Federal Regulations or elsewhere, and that the burden
of proof was on the registrant to prove that there was no basis in fact
for a I-A classification. 51 They learned that local boards sometimes
made decisions on the basis of communications from the Director of
45. Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955).
46. Most notably in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
47. "The Congress further declares that in a free society the obligations and privi-
leges of serving in the armed forces and the reserve components thereof should be
shared generally, in accordance with a system of selection which is fair and just ... "
Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 App. U.S.C. § 451(c) (1970).
48. Experts found their best precedents in their own files. See, e.g., Tietz, Con-
scientious Objection to War and Related Problems, CiviL RIGHTS AND LBERTMS HAND-
BooK 235, 235cc (A. Ginger ed. 1963, Supp. 1965-66).
49. For information on this subject, see cases collected and reported by the Cen-
tral Committee for Conscientious Objectors, 2016 Walnut St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19103.
50. 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1(b) (1967).
51. 32C.F.R. §§ 1622.10,1623.2 (1967).
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Selective Service,5" ignoring regulations published in the customary
fashion in the Federal Register. 3
Lawyers had difficulty obtaining up-to-date copies of the regula-
tions and local board memos governing the System, 4 and, in order
to begin to deal with the legal questions in this field, these non-draft
lawyers first had to obtain a comprehensive, detailed description of
the actual operation of the Selective Service System. 5 Next they de-
manded the collection and publication of all available sources of law
and recent opinions, whether or not they would later be reported in
the Federal Supplement or Federal Reporter series. While this prob-
lem was being solved by the appearance in 1968 of the Selective Ser-
vice Law Reporter,56 lawyers began holding conferences to learn from
the few veterans and to share experiences with the multitude of new-
comers. Slowly, a few law schools began to offer seminars on draft
law and reviews began publishing material on draft law developments.
Lawyers moved, in essence, from the First Amendment to the
Fifth Amendment, from arguments based on freedom of religion and
conscience to arguments based on denials of due process on ever-
narrower grounds.
Lawyers representing registrants wanting to avoid military service
obtained inspired cooperation from law clerks to federal judges, them-
selves often facing draft problems.57 Lay specialists (paraprofession-
als) also developed intimate knowledge of all of the draft-related
sources of law and many worked full-time at their occupations in and
near college campuses, so that clients seeking lawyers for the first time
often had already raised due process questions properly and timely
as the War dragged on.
Some of the fruits of this intensive work can be found in the
plethora of reported opinions on draft law. But the full harvest will
probably be forever hidden in the files of lawyers and assistant United
States attorneys, showing prosecutions dropped and charges dismissed
52. See, for example, the letter by the Director of the Selective Service System,
General Hershey, to local boards, reprinted in 113 CONG. REC. 16, 375 (daily ed. Nov.
14, 1967).
53. As required by 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
54. The Government Printing Office official copies of new Regulations and Local
Board Memos were received by subscribers one to three months after issuance.
55. See, e.g., Ginger, Minimum Due Process Standards in Selective Service Cases,
19 HASTINGS L.J. 1313, 1319 (1968).
56. Published by Public Law Education Institute, Washington, D.C.
57. See, e.g., Harris, From Judge's Clerk to Community Lawyer, THE RELEVANT
LAWYERS 319, 322 (A. Ginger ed. 1972).
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because of the failure of local draft boards to follow the latest due
process requirements set forth by the federal courts. s By the time
the Vietnam War was winding down in the spring of 1973, many cases
were being decided on the basis of sophisticated statistical analyses
of old draft board records to prove that defendants charged with failure
to obey induction orders had, in fact, been called out of order.59 Of-
ten the only people fully cognizant of the critical factors in such order-
of-call cases were one expert for the System and one expert retained
by defense lawyers.60 Their discussions of the relevant lists of regis-
trants usually determined whether the motion to dismiss was granted
or denied, with recourse to arguments before a district court judge
in only a few disputed cases.
By this time, the United States attorneys' offices had come to see
what defense lawyers had long claimed, that denials of due process
were so common that almost any answers on applications for non I-
A status (as for conscientious objector status or for dependency defer-
ments) might make it difficult to get a conviction. This led to dis-
missal of charges in many cases in 1972 and 1973 that would have
been tried in 1965 or 1966.
These results could scarcely have been forecast when an occa-
sional lawyer sued a local draft board, claiming a denial of due process
for failure to provide up-to-date forms,61 or challenging punitive re-
classifications for demonstrating against the draft, 62 even though simi-
lar acts would have been considered obvious denials of due process
in other fields.
In fact, an issue basic to due process (and to law practice) was
never authoritatively resolved by the end of the Vietnam War and the
conclusion of drafting power by the System: the right to assistance
of counsel in local draft board classification hearings. 63 The basic
rules for reaching decisions on classifications were never changed to
58. See unreported decisions described in publications of Central Committee for
Conscientious Objectors, note 49 supra, and Meiklejohn Institute Draft and Military
Law Collection (1964-1972) (University Microfilms 1973).
59. 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (1967).
60. E.g., United States v. McNeil, Criminal No. CR-73-0098-OJC (N.D. Cal.;
dismissed Apr. 25, 1973).
61. E.g., Del Bourgo v. Mansfield, 300 F. Supp. 500 (N.D. Cal. 1967), dismissed
as moot after plaintiff granted conscientious objector status, 300 F. Supp. 502 (N.D.
Cal. 1968); see United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
62. Breen v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U.S. 460 (1970).
63. In United States v. Weller, defendant urged invalidity of the Selective Service
System regulation denying counsel to registrants as a defense to the crime of draft re-
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provide many customary due process protections. 4
Still, the saga of the development of draft law from 1965 to 1973
is the saga of due process-from its almost total absence to its accept-
ability as a legitimate requirement, even in a field clothed with na-
tional security interests,6 and until recently, run by a general of the
United States Army.
Some lawyers came to draft law from previous experience with
administrative agencies claiming to protect national security interests
and dealing with claimants having little political power: aliens and
the Immigration and Naturalization Service,66 witnesses and the House
Committee on Un-American Activities,67 and defendants charged with
failure to register under the Subversive Activities Control Act. 1s
These lawyers found themselves hours ahead of their colleagues who
fusal. The federal district court dismissed the indictment on this ground, holding "a
registrant's personal appearance before his local board is in every sense an adjudication
at which the registrant should be awarded traditional judicial safeguards." 309 F. Supp.
50, 55 (N.D. Cal. 1969). The United States Supreme Court remanded to the Ninth
Circuit for lack of jurisdiction over this direct appeal from the district court. 401 U.S.
254 (1971). The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal since the district court had dis-
missed the indictment. 466 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1972).
For a view of the increased bar concern with denial of counsel at local board
hearings, see the amicus brief filed at the circuit court level by the American Bar As-
sociation Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities in Weller, reported in Metro-
politan News, May 9, 1972, at 1, cols. 4-5.
64. While 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1(b) (1973) no longer contains a prohibition against
attorneys accompanying registrants to personal appearances before local draft boards,
it does not contain permission for such representation, and 32 C.F.R. § 1626.4(d)
(1973) specifically prohibits such representation before an appeal board. Registrants
are still assumed to be eligible for 1-A classifications unless they prove to the contrary.
32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.1 (a), 1623.2 (1973). Registrants still must guess why their applica-
tions for classifications other than 1-A were rejected by their local boards originally.
They still must rely on their own summaries of personal appearances before local
boards as the sole records of those hearings. 32 C.F.R. § 1624.4(b) (1973). Many
changes have been made in other aspects of Selective Service proceedings to comply
with due process requirements urged by registrants and courts, e.g., boards must record
reasons for rejecting requested classifications, 32 C.F.R. § 1624.6 (1973).
65. "[Elven the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguard-
ing essential liberties." Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426
(1934).
66. See generally, Gordon, Due Process of Law in Immigration Proceedings, 50
A.B.A.J. 34 (1964); Committee on Immigration and Naturalization [Ginger], National
Lawyers Guild, Political Deportations in the United States: A Study in Enforcement
Procedures: 1919-1952, 14 LAwYERS GUILD REV. 93 (1954). See also cases collected
in DocKET, supra note 17, at §§ 259, 358-59.
67. See, e.g., Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958), and cases collected
in DocKET, supra note 17, at §§ 222, 271, 331.
68. See, e.g., Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965),
and cases collected in DOCKET, supra note 17, at § 211.
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had been steeped in commercial law (where litigants are often evenly
matched in formal judicial proceedings), and in criminal law (where
some due process requirements are taken for granted).
But What Does Due Process Mean?
While the example of draft law may be helpful to those exploring
new fields, such as prison, juvenile, and education law, it does not
supply a definition of due process. In other words, an interest in due
process, a commitment to it, or even its constant use in law practice,
does not supply its full definition. What is included in this phrase, and
what excluded?
In chronological terms, when must due process begin?
The fact-gathering phase of litigation has received increasing atten-
tion in the past twenty years. There has been a vast expansion of dis-
covery techniques and denigration of surprise during trial as the best
method of arriving at the facts. This development requires that due
process be present long before a case reaches trial or hearing, where
most facts are merely presented and only a few are newly uncovered.
After discovering the facts, the next step is setting standards for
their presentation, i.e., providing rules of court and regulations for pro-
cedure in administrative agencies. We have a constitutional commit-
ment to making laws in public69 and have committed ourselves through
the Administrative Procedure Act to making most -rules in public.70
Due process then requires that the rules and regulations be fol-
lowed uniformly in the conduct of trials and hearings, and that fact-
determinations and judgments be based on such rules and regulations.
In other words due process has expanded from presentation of
the facts in trial backward to include fact-discovering in pretrial.- It
has expanded forward from trial and decision to include post-decision
remedies. It has also expanded outward from equal treatment of
equals (i.e., trial of cases in which both parties have funds to pay
attorney fees and court costs). Now it includes many cases requiring
equal treatment of unequals (i.e., trial of cases in which one party
has a cause of action or defense but no funds to litigate it).
Beyond these preliminaries, what does due process mean?
Looking to authoritative definitions by Supreme Court justices
often leads to bemusement rather than enlightenment. 1 Facing "broad,
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
70. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11, 1121, 1123, 2001 (1946), reenacted as 5 U.S.C. §§
551 et seq., 701 et seq., 3105 (1971).
71. See, for example, Justice Miller's interesting discussion of the history and
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and flexible words and phrases like 'fair trial,' 'fundamental decency,'
and 'reasonableness,' " one wants to join in Justice Black's scorn for
"[s]uch stretchy, rubberlike terms" because they "would have left judges
constitutionally free to try people charged with crime under will-o'-the-
/ wisp standards improvised by different judges for different defendents.
'72
Looking to lower court judges for relief from due process denials
provides little enlightenment, particularly on threshold questions. South-
ern lawyers report, for example, that in the early days of the civil rights
movement of the 1950s, requests for enforcement of due process pro-
tections were often met by judicial abstention. "You're in the wrong
court, counsellor. We don't deal with constitutional rights and that
sort of thing here. That's for the Supreme Court.
7 a
Looking to articles by academicians, one seeks a due process defi-
nition that will be useful in civil and administrative, as well as in crim-
inal, cases. One finds, instead, some of the questions that must be
answered in order to define due process, 74 but so far one finds few
answers.
In 1960, the Court was using the phrase "minimal standards of
due process"'75 to refer to the requirement of a fair hearing for a crim-
inally-accused. At about the same time, an experienced trial lawyer
was saying he considered the bare minimum procedural requirement
in any case to be a jury trial.7 6  An administrative law professor mean-
while maintained that there could be no "minimum" due process
standards: Due process is due process period. 77  But at the end of
the decade, the Court was still talking about the "rudiments" of due
process being all that was required in some kinds of cases.
78
meaning of due process from his vantage point soon after adoption of the Fourteenth
'Amendment, in Davidson v. Board of Adm'rs, 96 U.S. 98, 101-04 (1878).
72. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 358, 426 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
73. Conversation with E.A. Dawley, who practiced law in Norfolk, Virginia. See
Holt (and Dawley) v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965); Dawley v. City of Norfolk, 260
F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959).
74. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
349-52 (1960); Newman, The Process of Prescribing "Due Process," 49 CALIF. L. REV.
215 (1961).
75. "The failure to accord [a criminally] accused a fair hearing violates even
the minimal standards of due process." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1960).
76. Conversation with Charles Garry long before his jury victories (acquittals or
hung juries with cases not retried) in defending Black Panther leaders; People v. New-
ton, 8 Cal. App, 3d 359 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1970); People v. Seale, Crim. No.
15844 (Super. Ct. New Haven, Conn. 1971); People v. Rios (Los Siete de la Raza),
Crim. No. 75129 (Super. Ct. San Francisco, Ca. 1970).
77. Conversation with Professor Frank Newman while writing Ginger, Minimum
Due Process Standards in Selective Service Cases, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1313 (1968).
78. "We wish to add that we, no less than the dissenters, recognize the impor-
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With this backdrop, perhaps it will help for a practitioner to ask
directly: What can I do with due process in my next case? This will
certainly focus the question, and just might provide a definition, or
at least a list of elements.
What Can I Do with Due Process?
The general practitioner frequently has too many cases and too
little time to prepare them. The lawyer seeks a checklist to help at
the beginning of work on a case in a new field, or turns to one in
despair when bogged down in a hard case in a familiar field. One
needs suggestions for research that might not come to mind by study-
ing the specialized literature in a narrow field, which is often limited
to discussion of rules, regulations, and precedents from that field. The
lawyer needs some consideration of general approaches being tried
on parallel problems in fields usually considered dissimilar.
Federal judge Peckham used this kind of analysis on the right
to counsel in Selective Service proceedings in United States v.
Weller,7" contrasting the procedural rights in the System with those
in other administrative and judicial agencies. He found that the Sys-
tem provided fewer rights than those present in government security
clearance cases (right -to confrontation, right to cross-examination) ;80
in juvenile proceedings (right to counsel);8 ' in liquor license applica-
tion proceedings;8 in hearings on termination of welfare payments
(right to appear in person);8 3 in bar admission application proceed-
ings;84 and in small claims proceedings (right to counsel).85 He con-
cluded that right to counsel should be provided to registrants.
Reasoning by analogy may be the only path to success when seek-
ing a new rule of law, particularly in a controversial, public law field.
Professor Arthur E. Sutherland illustrated this point by taking the ele-
ments at issue in a series of criminal cases and inventing a fact situa-
tance of not imposing upon the States or the Federal Government in this developing
field of (welfare] law any procedural requirements beyond those demanded by rudi-
mentary due process." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (Brennan, I.).
79. 309 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal. 1969). See note 63 supra.
80. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
81. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
82. Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
83. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
84. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
85. Mendoza v. Small Claims Court, 49 Cal. 2d 668, 321 P.2d 9 (1958); Pru-
dential Ins. Co. v. Small Claims Court, 76 Cal. App. 2d 379, 173 P.2d 38 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1946).
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tion in probate law in which those elements were present. He felt
that people who are for the maintenance of law and order (in the
criminal law field), and for precedent and against liberal construction
(in the constitutional law field), would have to re-examine their views
when faced with an analogous situation from a field in which they
"knew" what constituted a denial of due process: 6
Suppose a well-to-do testatrix says she intends to will her
property to Elizabeth. John and James want her to bequeath it
to them instead. They capture the testatrix, put her in a care-
fully designed room, out of touch with everyone but themselves
and their convenient 'witnesses,' keep her secluded there for hours
while they make insistent demands, weary her with contradictions
of her assertions that she wants to leave her money to Elizabeth,
and finally induce her to execute the will in their favor. Assume
that John and James are deeply and correctly convinced that Eliz-
abeth is unworthy and will make base use of the property if she
gets her hands on it, whereas John and James have the noblest
and most righteous intentions. Would any judge of probate accept
the will so procured as the 'voluntary' act of the testatrix?s7
The success of this technique is evinced by Chief Justice Warren's
use of the example in Miranda v. Arizona,"8 where it supported the
restatement of old law, 9 and the establishment of a new penalty for
law violation.9" (The durability of the Miranda rule in our society
really depends on the understanding of this analogy by the general
public and its insistence that the rule survive judicial or other tamper-
ing.)
91
In order to make use of this technique, one must isolate the ele-
ments at issue in a given case, find a field in which rules have been
established that would be advantageous to one's client if applied to
his facts, and then invent a fact situation from the other field similar
to his. This requires, first of all, isolating the elements of unfairness.
This process leads us to the physical sciences, where knowledge
is constantly increased as finer distinctions can be drawn between one
subspecies and another. The scientific method has at its root the cor-
rect identification and separation of specimens.9 2  Such separation, or
86. Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79 HAxv. L. REv. 21 (1965).
87. Id. at 37.
88. 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 n.26 (1966).
89. Id. at 442-43.
90. Id. at 444-45.
91. See Michigan v. Tucker, - F.2d - (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W.
3325, 3333 (U.S. Dec. 3, 1973) (No. 73-482).
92. See Scientific Method, in ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 418, 421 (1970) (discus-
sion of classification).
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listing, often provides new insights into the proper definition of each
species, and ultimately suggests how it develops and interacts with its
fellows. While law is neither a physical nor a natural science, it is
considered one of the social sciences, and is certainly amenable to use
of the scientific method. This method can also be useful in studying,
not law, but law practice, with which this article is concerned.
Law practice requires extensive knowledge of society in general
as well as specific knowledge of the legal principles in a particular
case. It requires objective analysis of the relationship between the
particular litigation and the general tenor of the times.93  The practice
of law can be described as a rough-and-ready attempt to earn a living
by using rules with some modicum of predictability in affairs involving
two or more conflicting parties. Often the dispute involves issues sig-
nificant to society as a whole, as well as to the individual participants.
This means that the need for objective tools of analysis94 is even more
necessary than in a private field of research, where public pressure
is largely absent.
In searching for such objective tools, I decided to attempt to form-
ulate an Advocate's Comprehensive Guide to the elements of due pro-
cess.
What Are the Sources of Due Process?
In order to prepare a comprehensive list of the elements con-
tained in the concept of due process, it is necessary to know where
to look for them among the thousands of cases and statutes in which
due process is involved. A quick overview of American history sug-
gests that major ferment about fairness in procedures has bubbled up
several times, leading to the adoption of a series of requirements or
standards that might be considered elements of due process.9"
93. See O.W. HOLMES, THm COMMON LAW 1 (1881): "The felt necessities of
the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed
or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had
a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men
should be governed."
94. Justice Frankfurter reached the same conclusion in Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952), after his many efforts to be specific without joining Justice Black
in incorporating the entire Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, and without
making a list of due process requirements. "In each case 'due process of law' requires
an evaluation based on a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a
balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the detached consideration of con-
flicting claims. . . on a judgment not ad hoc and episodic but duly mindful of recon-
ciling the needs both of continuity and of change in a progressive society." Id. at
172.
95. Of course, concern about due process and the adoption of standards has not
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The major attack against King George's method of governing the
American colonies was his absolute power, his authority to determine
legislative, administrative, economic, religious, and judicial policy.
One of the main propaganda weapons for American independence was
the King's denial of prompt trial by local juries of peers and his author-
ization of unreasonable searches and seizures. Memories of these
wrongs led to provisions in the United States Constitution guaranteeing
separation of powers in the three branches of government, 96 prohibit-
ing ex post facto laws97 and bills of attainder,98 and guaranteeing hab-
eas corpus as a remedy for unfair detention.99
These memories led also to formulation of bills of rights in the
several colonies, and to adoption of the first ten amendments to the
Constitution.10" These protections applied in civil and criminal cases,
but applied only to unfair acts by the federal government against the
people.'
0 1
The next major advance in due process came after the bloody
Civil War with abolition of the category of work known as slavery
through adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment. This sharply in-
creased the number of people entitled to fair treatment in the state
and federal systems. It soon led to the adoption of a second amend-
ment to insure that the spirit of the Thirteenth would be upheld.'0 2
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extended pro-
tections in civil and criminal cases to unfair acts by state governments
against the people.
The Fourteenth Amendment also enunciated a new requirement:
that no state deny to any person equal protection of the laws. For
a century, this was considered a requirement separate and distinct from
due process of law, and became synonymous with "civil rights" and
"no discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, or national ori-
gin." Congress, under the Radical Republicans, passed civil rights acts
meant, even in the periods of their formulation, that the standards were followed. See,
for example, treatment of Tories and Tory-sympathizers after the Revolutionary War,
while states were adopting bills of rights. VAN TYNE, THE LOYALISTS IN THE AMERI-
CAN REVOLUTION (1902).
96. U.S. CONST. arts. I-11.
97. Id. art. I, § 9.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. For an aid to research on colonial bills of rights see B. SCHWARTZ, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1971).
101. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
102. See TENBROEK, ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1951).
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with "revolutionary implications' '01 3 spelling out grounds for injunctions
and damage actions for denial of equal treatment.
Toward the close of the nineteenth century, Americans discov-
ered that the basic structure of their society had changed. The United
States was increasingly urban; the frontier had evaporated; competition
in a free marketplace was giving way to large corporations seeking
monopoly status at home and increased trade abroad; consumer regula-
tion of local business was losing out to national production and distri-
bution with few quality controls; and the need for massive immigration
was waning.
The spirit of Populism, and the disparate supporters of Teddy
Roosevelt, John Peter Altgeld, and Williams Jennings Bryan found two
new ways of dealing with these new problems: through public rather
than private effort, and through administrative fact-finding and deci-
sion-making rather than through judicial action. Without adopting
constitutional amendments on these matters, Congress voted to bust
the trusts through civil"" and criminal litigation, 05 to conserve some
natural resources, 00 to regulate railroad rates,10r and to regulate the
quality of important consumer goods'0 8 by means of federal adminis-
trative agencies that would reach decisions more efficiently than courts
could do.
Thirty years later, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
Food and Drug Administration, and agencies dealing with aliens 0 9 be-
came prototypes for the numerous agencies established to try to amel-
iorate the devastation of The Great Depression. Franklin D. Roose-
velt's "alphabet agencies" were supposed to use new sanctions and
103. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (originally enacted Act of Apr. 20, 1871,
ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13); 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) (originally enacted Act of Mar. 1, 1875,
ch. 114 § 5, 18 Stat. 337); see characterization by defendants in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422 (1968).
104. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970) (originally enacted July 2,
1890, ch. 647 § 1, 26 Stat. 209).
105. Id. §§ 1-3.
106. E.g., Forest Reserve Act, 16 U.S.C. § 471 et seq. (1970) (originally enacted
Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561 § 24, 26 Stat. 1103).
107. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11 (1970) (originally enacted Feb.
4, 1887, ch. 104 § 11, 24 Stat. 383).
108. E.g., Pure Food Act of 1906, ch. 3915 §§ 1-3, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1939).
109. Immigration, deportation and naturalization problems were handled by an
administrator and agency located in the Treasury Department (1882-1903), Depart-
ment of Commerce and Labor (1903-1913), and Department of Labor (1913-1940).
In 1940, the Immigration and Naturalization Service became an arm of the Justice De-
partment. C. GORDON & H. RosENFmw, 1 IMbIGRATION LAW AND pROCEURF, § 1.6b,
at 1-33 to 1-34 (rev. ed. 1973).
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benefits to deal with problems that had previously been considered
"economic" rather than "governmental." The agencies would work
administratively: making payments to farmers not to grow certain
crops, 110 forbidding sale of securities without prior study and approval
by a commission,"' and establishing a system of payments to unem-
ployed workers." 2
Other long festering issues also received attention. Almost from
the nation's beginning, employers and employees had been in conflict
over the right of workers to organize, the right to boycott products
made by employers who were "unfair" in labor relations, and the right
to strike. The judicial system had played a major role in these dis-
putes, finding that many of the weapons workers used to deal with
recalcitrant management were "criminal combinations in restraint
of trade.""'  By 1930, there was widespread agreement that organ-
ized workers must have their day in court before being enjoined from
strikes and picketing." 4 Ex parte labor injunctions were outlawed in
193215 and the following year a new Roosevelt Congress recognized
the right of workers to organize unions," 6 laying the basis for the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board," 7 a national administrative agency to
umpire most labor-management disputes outside the courts and with-
out judicial due process. 118
These major changes in the scope of government and in the
method of decision-making were also made without constitutional
amendment. Soon a person was more likely to take a legal problem
to an administrative agency than to a court. This did not solve any
arguments about fair procedure, of course. It shifted some of the con-
tinuous attacks on the judicial system to new attacks on administra-
tive procedures. And it added one new underlying question: Can
110. Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 608 (1970) (originally enacted ch.
25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933)).
111. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
112. Unemployment Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1970) (origin-
ally enacted Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531 § 301, 49 Stat. 626).
113. See Sherman, Unionization and Collective Bargaining, LABOR LAW GROUP
TRUST, 1 LABOR RELATIONS & SOCIAL PROBLEMS, 1-6 (2d ed. 1972); see generally i-
iv P. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1947).
114. F. FRANKFURTFR & N. GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
115. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101-15 (1920) (originally enacted ch.
90, 47 Stat. 20 (1932)).
116. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 198 § 7(a) (1933).
117. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1970) (originally enacted
ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)).
118. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970) (originally enacted ch. 372 § 10(b),
49 Stat. 453 (1935)).
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a person (or business) get as fair a decision from a new nonjudicial
body, called an administrative agency, as from an established judicial
body, called a court? If not, is the individual or business being denied
something basic to which he is entitled? If due process is being denied,
what remedies: are available?
While the arguments on this question were simmering, the United
States entered World War 11, and quickly found itself facing a problem
almost unprecedented in this country, although other nations had faced
it from their inception. The United States found itself facing scar-
cities, not only of manpower (in certain industries, and in the mili-
tary), but of some materials. It was not feasible to rely on the compet-
itive open-market system to solve these problems. For example,
there was too little housing near defense industries, and private indus-
try could not meet the demand. It became necessary to build tempor-
ary low-cost public housing.:"9  Some kinds of food were rationed;120
other scarce materials had to be allocated,' 2' and Congress approved
wage,' 22 price,123 and profit 24 limitations to be determined by admin-
istrative agencies. Disputes about agency decisions were settled first
by the agencies and only reached the courts on the appellate level.
The experiences of depression and war led to increased concern
about due process protections for those dealing with administrative
agencies. Many attacks on procedural unfairness were made by those
who also opposed the substance of the statutes being administered.
But lawyers found it possible to isolate procedural complaints from
substantive ones, and many years were spent by lawyers, agency appli-
cants, bar associations, judges, and law professors working over the
problems. They had, as examples, not only the New Deal and War
agencies, but the older agencies such as the ICC. Certainly the re-
sulting legislation, the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,25 was
119. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1503 (1970) (originally enacted Act of June 28, 1940,
ch. 440, 54 Stat. 676).
120. See Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 151, 55 Stat. 236 (1941); Second War Powers
Act, ch. 199 § 301, 56 Stat. 178 (1941); Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch.
26 § 201, 56 Stat. 23 (Congress delegating rationing power to president and power
to redelegate said power, and president redelegating rationing power to Office of Price
Administration); Oppenheimer, The War Price and Rationing Boards: An Experiment
in Decentralization, 43 COLUM. L. Rav. 147 (1943).
121. E.g., Priorities and Allocation Act, ch. 157, 55 Stat. 236 (1941); Second War
Powers Act, ch. 199, 56 Stat. 176 (1942).
122. War Stabilization Act of 1942, cl. 578, 56 Stat. 765.
123. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
124. War and Defense Contracts Act, ch. 440, 54 Stat. 676 (1940).
125. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
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proposed, studied, revised, debated, and finally adopted after more
participation by more agencies and individuals and longer considera-
tion than that given to most pieces of legislation in our history.
12 6
Unfortunately, the Administrative Procedure Act had been in ex-
istence only a year when the so-called Cold War began with Churchill's
Fulton speech and President Truman's Executive Order requiring loy-
alty oaths of all government employees. 11 7  The Cold War opened
the way for untold abuses of basic due process concepts in many
branches of government, creating legislative investigating commit-
tees,' 28 administrative procedures and independent boards'2 9 having
among their functions the dismissal of "security risks" and the listing
of individuals and organizations 130 in violation of the prohibition
against bills of attainder' 31 and of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.' 32 Violations of due process were built into the purpose and
operation of these agencies in the name of national security, and the
mood of the times permitted an unwilling but disunified Court to be
led onto the moor known as Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
v. McGrath,133 from which it issued six diffuse opinions worrying
the question of due process, but deciding nothing. The Court at this
critical moment provided no protection to millions of Americans af-
fected by the loyalty-security scare.
During this Cold War period, the public was encouraged to deni-
grate due process, and one protection got a particularly bad press, even
though it had been enshrined in a constitutional amendment. Not
wishing to attack freedom of speech and the First Amendment di-
rectly, Senator Joe McCarthy snarled down the "Fifth Amendment
126. See generally K. DAVIS, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.04 (1958).
127. Executive Order No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. § 627 (1947); Executive Order No.
10241, 3 C.F.R. § 751 (1951). See generally T. EMERSON, D. HABER, & N. DORSEN,
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 72-511 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN].
128. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, CONGRESS AND THE NATION,
1945-1964, ch. 17 (1965); EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN, supra note 127, at 428-31.
129. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7532 (1970) (originally enacted Act of Aug. 26, 1950, ch.
803, 64 Stat. 476); Executive Order No. 10450, 3 C.F.R. § 936 (1953); Subversive
Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024 §H 1-32, 64 Stat. 987 (establishing Subversive
Activities Control Board); EMERSON, HABER, & DORSEN, supra note 127, at 72-511 (es-
pecially notes and references 366-85).
130. See, e.g., Executive Order No. 9835, pt. 111(3) 3 C.F.R. § 627, 629 (1947)
(providing for creation of Attorney General's list for Civil Service Commission use);
EMERSON, HABER, & DORSEN, supra note 127, at 385.
131. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
132. Id. amend. V.
133. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
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Communists" who claimed their privilege against possible self-incrim-
ination in refusing to answer questions about their political beliefs and
affiliations.3 In this climate, it was considered a victory for due proc-
ess and liberty that the privilege was not removed from the Constitu-
tion by amendment. 3 5
Soon after Earl Warren was appointed Chief Justice in 1953, the
Supreme Court became the leading body in defining due process.
Justices making up the Warren Court began considering questions
raised by the Cold War, and reconsidering questions long ignored or
repeatedly decided against due process applicants. They heard and
decided a series of cases concerning alleged denials of due process
to those accused of customary crimes and those charged with "political
crimes."'" 6  Sometimes the justices provided new definitions or stand-
ards for protections contained in the Bill of Rights from the first due
process period. They also considered the application of the protec-
tions guaranteed in the first nine amendments to actions by state gov-
ernments through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.137
134. See, e.g., T"ImTY YEARs oF TREASON: EXCERPTS FROM HEARINGS BEFORE THE
House Commrr=E ON UN-AMERCAN Acrrlm~, 1938-1968, at 949 (Bentley ed.
1971). Senator McCarthy ignored the fact that most of the witnesses coupled this
claim with an attack on the authority of the investigating body to even ask the ques-
tions since, under the First Amendment, the body could not legislate in the area. See,
e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS CASEFInDER 1953-1969: THE WARREN COURT ERA, at category
331 (A. Ginger ed. 1972).
135. See the timely defense of the privilege by the then Dean of Harvard Law
School, E. GmiswoLD, THE Firm AmNDmENT TODAY (1955). No thorough study of
the effects of political repression on the operation of the American legal system has
yet appeared with full attention given to the Cold War-McCarthy period. In addition
to the results in particular lawsuits and the human consequences untold in litigation,
a study of the behavior of important nongovernmental institutions might help avoid
a similar period in the future. Institutions affecting the intellectual community (like
Harvard University) and public opinion (like the New York Times) deserve careful
scrutiny, since the present public image as to their behavior from 1947-1961 varies con-
siderably from the facts, even from my personal observations. The flabbiness of re-
spect for basic due process requirements, to say nothing of First Amendment liberties,
might better be documented, discussed, and faced.
136. Justice Douglas defined "political trials" and listed many in his separate opin-
ion in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 352-56 & n.2 (1970); see, e.g., Sacher v. United
States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958) (contempt of legislative investigating committee); Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (conspiracy to violate Smith Act); Jencks v.
United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) (filing false non-Communist oath).
137. Many justices of the Supreme Court have described the incorporation of the
Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, or the refusal to incorporate coupled
with the application of particular protections through the Fourteenth. Total incorpora-
tion: see, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 163 (1968) (Black, I., concurring);
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Selective in-
corporation: see, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Brennan, J.); Johnson v.
March 19741
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Having enlarged due process, the Warren Court then incorpor-
ated the equal protection requirements of the Fourteenth into the Fifth
Amendment, 138 and proceeded to outlaw unequal and segregated
treatment at federal and state levels in transportation,
3 9 housing, 140
courtrooms, 141 and prison administration,142 among other fields. (Oc-
casionally the Court based its decisions on the interstate commerce
clause as well as the combined factors of due process and equal pro-
tection.)' 43
But the Court's concern with equal protection did not stop there.
As groups other than racial, religious, or national began to demand
equal protection, the Court considered the effects of poverty,'" age,'45
residence,' 46 incarceration,"' student status,14 8 and marital status 49 on
treatment by various branches of government, state and federal.
Each victory for a due process applicant tended to increase the
use of due process arguments by counsel for applicants with similar,
and dissimilar, problems. Throughout this history, military law was
developing side by side with civil, criminal, and administrative law,
and was affected by precedents from these fields and by revision in
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 5 °
All of the kinds of litigation challenging unequal treatment in the
Warren Court period are proceeding in the 1970s, with additional
groups seeking consideration of their special problems: prisoners,"'
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 395-96 (1972) (note listing Bill of Rights provisions incor-
porated to date). Rejection of total and selective incorporation: see, e.g., Malloy v.
Hogan, supra at 14 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Duncan v. Louisiana, supra at 176 (Har-
lan, J., dissenting).
138. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
139. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
140. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
141. Hamilton v. Alabama, 275 Ala. 574, 156 So. 2d 926 (1963), afl'd per
curiam, 376 U.S. 650 (1964).
142. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
143. E.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 457 (1960). See text accompanying
notes 189-201, infra.
144. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
145. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
146. E.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
147. E.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1967).
148. E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969).
149. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
150. 10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1970). Protections in the Bill of Rights, except
those inapplicable expressly or by necessary implication, are available to members of
the armed forces. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953) (dictum); United States
v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430-31 (1960).
151. See several new publications on prison law, including PlusoN LAw REPORTER,
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the mentally ill,' 52 women,158 Native Americans," 4 students, 55 teach-
ers5 6 and professors, librarians,15 7 consumer groups,1 " trade union-
ists,159 citizens concerned about government secrecy'60 and improper
campaign practices,' 6' and groups concerned primarily with questions
of ecology, 62 and poverty.'
63
However, as the Warren Court era was ending, Congress passed
a series of "law and order" statutes modifying some recent court de-
cisions and endangering or limiting some constitutional provisions, in-
cluding the privilege against self-incrimination,' 64 the right to be at
liberty pending trial,16 5 and the protection against unreasonable search
edited by the Young Lawyers Section and the Commission on Correctional Facilities
and Services of the American Bar Association, Hoge Bldg., Seattle, WA. 98104.
152. See, e.g., B. ENNis & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS, THE BA-
sic ACLU GuDE TO A MENTAL PATIENT'S RIGHTS (1973); the Optimist Liaison report-
ing California programs and citizen involvement in serving the developmentally dis-
abled, 744 P St., Suite 724, Sacramento, Ca. 95814; Patient Advocacy Legal Service,
Washington Univ. Law School, St. Louis, Mo. 63130.
153. See, e.g., WOMEN's R. LAw RPTR., 180 University Ave., Newark, NJ. 07102,
and publications collected in the Spokeswoman, An Independent Monthly Newsletter
of Women's News, Chicago.
154. See, e.g., Akwesasne Notes, Mohawk Nation, via Rooseveltown, N.Y. 13683,
published by Program in American Studies of the State University of New York at
Buffalo and D-Q University, Box 409, Davis, California; National Indian Law Library
Catalogue, 1506 Broadway, Boulder, Colorado.
155. See, e.g, College Law Bulletin, Student Legal Rights Program of U.S. Na-
tional Students Association, 2115 S Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008.
156. See, e.g., publications for California teachers on their procedural rights,
Teacher Tenure 1971 and For Cause Only: Guide to Teacher Rights and Required
Administrative Procedures for Probationary Personnel Under Amended Education
Code Section 13443, California Teachers Association, Burlingame, California 94010.
157. See, e.g., American Library Association Newsletter on Intellectual Freedom,
50 E. Huron St., Chicago, I1. 60611.
158. See, e.g., Center for Study of Responsive Law, P.O. Box 19367, Washington,
D.C. 20036.
159. See, e.g., Union Democracy Review, Association for Union Democracy, 23
E. 16th Street, N.Y., N.Y. 10003.
160. See, e.g., Center for Study of Responsive Law: Freedom of Information
Clearing House, P.O. Box 19367, Washington, D.C. 20036.
161. See, e.g., Common Cause, 2030 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
162. See, e.g., ECOLOGy L. QUAiTERLY; National Institute for Consumer Justice,
Staff Studies, Washington, D.C.; Land Use Planning Reports, 2814 Pennsylvania Ave.,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007.
163. See, e..g, National Clearinghouse for Legal Services: Clearinghouse Review,
Northwestern University School of Law, 710 N. Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Ill.
60611; Welware Law News, Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, 25 W. 43rd St.,
N.Y., N.Y. 10036; Health Rights News, Medical Committee for Human Rights, 2251
W. Taylor, Chicago, IIl. 60612.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 2514 (1970).
165. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (1973).
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(by means of electronic surveillance).166
Some lawyers have become concerned that the Burger Court is
not applying due process concepts in situations in which the Warren
Court did SO, 1 67 and that it is limiting some of the formulations of
its predecessor. 6 ' These lawyers have developed at least one effec-
tive response; they raise independent state grounds for reversing con-
victions or challenging statutes, namely, the due process clauses in
state constitutions. Narrow United States Supreme Court decisions
then cannot change the outcome of a particular case won before a
state supreme court, and cannot change the law of the state. 19
What Are The Limits On Due Process?
This quick overview of due process history leads to the question:
What are the present limits on due process standards? Examining that
question, one finds at least six kinds of current disputes requiring fair
procedures for settlement:
1. Fair procedures are needed to find the facts in individual cases
and to make decisions in such cases. In other words, who should win
as between P and D? (In such cases, there is no quota or desired
figure for victories for P or D.) The questions here are the proper
standards for fact-finding and decision-making, and whether those
standards were followed in a particular case.
2. Fair procedures are needed to determine whether P should
be able to get a license to do something. (Here there is no D, and
again, there is no limit on how many other Ps can get licenses.) The
question here is the proper standard for pursuit of the activity (such
as running a restaurant or driving a car) in fields which still can be
pursued by any number without insoluble problems for society.
166. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2517 (1970).
167. E.g., United States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973) (search and seizure);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (search); United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973) (entrapment); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (re-
quiring filing fee in bankruptcy); California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 42 U.S.L.W.
4481 (Apr. 1, 1974) (Nos. 72-985, 72-1073, 72-1196); United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745 (1971) (eavesdropping).
168. E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (limiting affirmative litigation
to avoid state criminal prosecutions under unconstitutional state statutes provided for
in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965)). But see Steffel v. Thompson, 42
U.S.L.W. 4357 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1974).
169. Rios v. Cozens, 9 Cal. 3d 454, 509 P.2d 696, 107 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1973);
People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973); Keys v.
State, 283 So. 2d 919 (Miss. S. Ct. 1973); see Mosk, The Constitution of California
in the Era of the Burger Court and States' Rights, Los Angeles Daily Journal, Dec. 19,
1973 Report Section, at 26-29.
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3. Increasingly, fair procedures are needed to determine whether
P1, P2, or P3 should be permitted to get a license or pursue a career
(or use a life-preserving medical machine in short supply) in fields
in which there seems to be an absolute maximum number of licenses
(such as television and radio channel owners1 70) or there is a maxi-
mum at the moment and no easy way to increase it (such as seats
in medical and dental schools, housing in low-cost public projects, and
spaces in childcare facilities).
4. In the future, fair procedures will be needed to determine
whether everyone must be forbidden to do an increasing number of
acts because of their anticipated detrimental effect on society as a
whole, despite their current beneficent character. This may include
such acts as stripmining, building atomic power plants in populated
areas needing new sources of power, disposing of raw sewage in a
presently-remote area, etc.
171
5. In that same future, fair procedures will be needed to deter-
mine whether everyone must be required to do an increasing number
of acts because of their anticipated beneficial effect on society as a
whole, despite their current neutral or negative effect on the individ-
ual. This list has long included vaccinations of school children' 72 and
blood tests before marriage.17  Compulsory use of seat belts may be
added on the individual side, and limitations on use of natural re-
sources on the institutional side.
6. Now and in the future, fair and adequate procedures are
needed to find all of the facts necessary to reach decisions on policy
questions (as opposed to decisions settling disputes between specific
individuals and groups). For instance, should the federal government,
through its legislative arm and/or through the Department of Trans-
portation, encourage resurrection of rail transit for passenger travel,
or can the problems of pollution due to automobile exhausts and air-
plane emissions be solved satisfactorily?17  Should the Department
170. E.g., Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 326 U.S.
327, 333 (1946).
171. See publications cited note 162 supra.
172. E.g., French v. Davidson, 143 Cal. 658, 77 P. 663 (1904); CAL. HEALTH
& S. CODE § 3481 (West Supp. 1973).
173. E.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 4300 (West Supp. 1973).
174. This is the sort of policy question Professor Davis mentions as a new field
for due process in administration, in K. DAvis, ADmISTRATIvE LAw T tEA isB § 1.04
(Supp. 1970). Congressman Lee Aspin suggests the need for reform of congressional
rules that relate to the decision of many policy questions, i.e., how to settle disputes
between House and Senate versions of bills in conference committees. See Aspin, Bil-
lion-Dollar Loophole, 38 THE PnoGossrv 35 (Jan. 1974).
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of Defense be absolutely forbidden to supply war materiel to foreign
governments, or should each contract require a specific State Depart-
ment request and Congressional approval?
If one relies solely on the formal, legal sources of due process
standards-the Constitution and amendments, statutes, regulations,
common law, and recent precedents--one can only deal with certain
of these disputes. The major focus here is on fair procedures in set-
tling disputes that can be framed as cases between definable parties,
i.e., the questions posed in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3. The broad policy
questions posed in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 must await study by later
due process advocates.
This focus may lead the philosopher to ask: Is it permissible to
have different procedures in different agencies; in agencies and in
courts; in criminal and civil cases; in civil and military cases; in legis-
lative, administrative and judicial hearings; in state and federal pro-
ceedings? 175  This article will resolutely avoid dealing with this string
175. In addition to the questions suggested in note 33 supra, and to questions
posed by articles on specific problems (e.g., Gough, The Beyond-Control Child and
the Right to Treatment: An Exercise in the Synthesis of Paradox, 16 ST. Louis U.LJ.
182 (1971)), we face more fundamental questions: 1) Should the procedures followed
in 1789 govern due process requirements today? If they were not uniform throughout
the colonies, which should prevail? 2) Were different procedures developed in various
administrative agencies because different classes of people and institutions came before
them, i.e., railroad corporations, juveniles, prisoners, the mentally ill, welfare recipients,
foreign born, draftees, dealers in securities, television and radio stations, senior citi-
zens? 3) Were different procedures required because different consequences flowed
from decisions: loss of liberty, loss of property, loss of life? 4) Should due process
requirements attach to actions now considered "private," such as those between parent
and child, doctor and patient, seller and consumer, husband and wife, public figure and
press, and should additional requirements attach to the relationship between lawyers
and clients beyond confidentiality?
We also face judgmental questions: 1) Are we providing the fairness in criminal
procedures required by the Constitution and underlined in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966)? 2) Are we more concerned about fairness in the procedures to de-
termine guilt than about fairness in the procedures used to determine punishment when
guilt has been established? Should we be? And specifically what standards should
be required of agencies (such as the California Adult Authority) in deciding length,
place, and nature of detention?
These questions lead to still others: 3) Should the due process standards guaran-
teed in a federal criminal case govern a proceeding that will become a federal crimi-
nal case if the administrative decision is contested (e.g., some Selective Service and
Internal Revenue decisions)? If so, what is the critical stage at which the administra-
tive proceeding becomes the first step in the criminal case?
4) Should we be more concerned about fairness to the criminally-accused than
about fairness to self-supporting claimants: a) the worker seeking reinstatement on his
job, b) the person seeking reinstatement for Social Security or other benefits to which
he contributed directly, c) the person seeking commercial or personal credit? d) the
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of questions in order to limit itself to the practitioner's related ques-
tions: What procedures deny constitutional standards of due process?
In what forum should one complain about the failure to follow pre-
scribed procedures, challenge the existing procedures as inadequate,
or demand the formulation of new procedures?
What Is Due Process Today?
Specifically, the practicing lawyer wants to know what due process
questions to watch for in studying the facts in a case and in listing
the procedures followed and bypassed. One needs to know what is
possible if the step (e.g., a hearing) or the requirement (e.g., a jury)
was not provided. Can the decision be attacked successfully as one
denying due process? Can the whole proceeding be stayed until the
requirement is provided? Or is the lack of this step or requirement
without legal significance, mere harmless error?176  Sometimes one
also wants to know, as a policy matter, whether to propose a statute
or regulation requiring a particular step, or to seek to repeal a statute
forbidding it.
In order to answer the questions posed above, and to define due
process, an Advocate's Comprehensive Guide to Due Process Re-
consumer seeking redress for bad quality goods? 5) Should we be more concerned
about fairness to the criminally-accused than about fairness to the dependent person
seeking to obtain welfare, aid to dependent children, or other government benefits to
which he did not contribute directly? 6) In other words, should decisions concerning
the majority of people in the normal affairs of their lives (as workers and consumers)
be governed by fewer legal standards than decisions concerning a small proportion of
the people in the extraordinary situations in which they are charged with criminal ac-
tivity? 7) And the related question is whether decisions concerning the majority of
people in the occasional affairs of their lives (while temporarily or partially disabled
or jobless) should be governed by fewer legal standards than decisions concerning the
criminally-accused? In short, should the criminally-accused receive greater protection,
or protections spelled out more clearly, than the worker, consumer, disabled, or indigent
person? See, e.g., Cooper, Should Administrative Hearing Procedures Be Less Fair
than Criminal Trials?, 53 A.B3.A.J. 237 (1967).
8) As to administrative agencies, should an investor challenging a corporate decision
have greater protection than a draft registrant seeking an exemption or a taxpayer chal-
lenging a tax assessment or a long-term resident alien fighting a deportation order?
If so, why, and how should the proper procedures be determined? If not, what
changes, if any, must be made to equalize the procedures 'in the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service, the Selective Service System, the Internal Revenue Service, and the
Securities Exchange Commission?
Of course, the final question must be: 9) Is there a single set of rules for fact-
finding and decision-making that should or must be applied universally?
176. E.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (repeated comments by
prosecutor referring to defendants' refusal to take the stand did not constitute harmless
error). Contra, Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) (conviction based on
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quirements and Standards of Fairness is attempted here. This is an
extension of the procedural guides to which California lawyers have
become accustomed through the early work of the California Continu-
ing Education of the Bar.17 7  I know of no similar list and therefore
offer this as a helpful draft, warning that it needs further analysis and
criticism. It especially needs input from specialists in disciplines in
which due process problems are emerging (ecology, land-use planning,
medicine, the phsycial sciences, and economics).
This is an advocate's guide, as opposed to a scholar's or judge's
guide. It is intended to help the practitioner find due process issues
in cases and authoritative citations to use in arguing that customary
due process was denied a client, or that due process customary in other
fields should be extended to cover a client. This guide is nonjudg-
mental; it excludes no due process requirement for which an authori-
tative citation can be found. (For example, it is not concerned with
the argument that jury trials cost too much or that they slow down
the judicial process.)
7
More than that, the guide includes a few standards that were once
acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court or Congress, but
that have since been rejected. For example, trial by a jury of twelve
in federal civil cases is listed in column one and the supporting au-
thority in column two. Of course, the decision overruling the standard
is also given in column two (in italics). While a scholar or judge might
simply have deleted this standard from his due process guide when
the Burger Court handed down Colgrove v. Battin179 in the spring of
1973, should not an advocate take a different position? Shouldn't a
lawyer argue that a 12-person jury is constitutionally required in a fed-
eral civil case with more compelling facts than were present in Col-
grove (a personal injury case with no especially significant litigants
on either side)? A lawyer representing a black plaintiff suing a police
officer for damages for injuries inflicted during police custody"s' might
improper admission into evidence of confessions of co-conspirators affirmed because
cumulative evidence of guilt rendered error harmless).
177. See, e.g., Ginger, Chronological Guide to Criminal Law, in 2 CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE 781-823 (1969).
178. The data cited by the Supreme Court in support of changes in jury size await
further analysis. For a statement praising jury trials, see CHESTERTON, TREMENDOUS
TRIFLES: THE TWELVE MEN 86-7 (1922), quoted by trial judge Richard E. Amason
after the jury verdict of acquittal in People v. Davis, Criminal No. 52613 (Superior
Ct., Santa Clara County, Cal. 1972), reported in San Francisco Chronicle, June 5,
1972, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
179. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
180. For example, under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25
convince at least one justice who voted with the majority in Colgrove
that the only real possibility of keeping some members of minority
groups on a jury panel is to have a jury larger than six, i.e., the old
12-person jury.181 It seems too soon to omit the requirement, so long
assumed to be essential to fair trial, and makes Coigrove too definitive
for lawyers who lived to see another Colgrove (v. Green),'82 Betts
v. Brady,188 and Gobitis184 bite the dust within a short span of years.
The guide takes the same position as to the need for transactional
rather than use immunity.'185
The guide seeks to be comprehensive, to include every federal
due process requirement and every standard of fairness for which
there is an authoritative source. No distinction is made between "sub-
stantive" and "procedural" due process.
The distinction between due process requirements of constitu-
tional stature and standards of fairness based on statutes, statutory
construction, and custom is shown in the authorities cited. The major
sources of the due process requirements are the obvious ones: the
federal Constitution and Bill of Rights, the Reconstruction Amend-
ments, and opinions of the United States Supreme Court construing
them. The major source of the standards of fairness is the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, supplemented by standards for agencies not
covered by the APA. Supreme Court and other opinions construing
these and other statutes are provided.
A few state requirements are given, with citations to state author-
ities (usually California, with which I am most familiar). To make
the guide useful nationally, lawyers may insert local constitutional pro-
visions, statutes (particularly state administrative procedure acts), reg-
ulations, ordinances and case law, in column two.
An effort has been made to be inclusive in titles to categories,
e.g., TRIAL/HEARING/APPEARANCE. The "appearance" in this
181. But see Comment, Monetary Claims Under Section 1983: The Right to Trial
by Jury, 8 HARv. Civ. RIGT-_CIV. Lm. L. REv. 613 (1973) for a suggestion that jury
trials are not likely to result in fair verdicts in just such Civil Rights Act cases due
to the prevalence of racism in jurors.
182. 328 U.S. 549 (1946), overruled in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (dis-
tricting).
183. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (right to counsel).
184. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled in
West Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory
flag salute).
185. See Advocates Guide, pp. 937-959 infra., at number 31.
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case refers to a personal appearance before a local draft board, but
may have other uses, and the "hearing" includes the so-called "fair
hearing" in welfare cases. The Court has made it clear that labels
do not determine legal principles."8 6 It is hoped that labels used here
will not interfere with comprehension.
Some requirements in column one may appear to be so broad
as to be meaningless without careful definition, which is impossible
in a chart. The phrases come largely from the documents listed in
column two, so that the right to a hearing before being "deprived" of
"liberty" or "property," for example, comes straight out of the Fifth
Amendment, and I am not foolhardy enough to propose a narrower
phrasing.'1 7  Authoritative definitions of the words are either sug-
gested in the materials cited in column two or are easily found in case-
books, hornbooks, or articles.
The material is in list form for easier accessibility, and is given
in the order followed in the typical case. Some requirements, such
as right to counsel, appear in more than one place.88 Some require-
ments are subdivided further than others. This is due merely
to the availability of authoritative statements concerning them and is
not intended as a value judgment concerning their relative importance.
The purpose is to draw the outermost limits of due process.
Wherever possible, the judicial citations are to decisions in which the
stated requirement was held essential, and to statutes or regulations
in which the requirement is spelled out, not simply to definitions of
due process by courts and other agencies. The words "due process"
may not appear in the cited opinion, and another constitutional phrase,
such as "equal protection," may even be given by the court as the
rationale for the decision. Or the court may say it is simply construing
a statute or doing what is required to be "fair."
This guide includes, at number 48, a list of inherently suspect
186. "[A] State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere la-
bels." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
187. Justice Stewart dissected the alleged dichotomy between "personal liberties"
and "property rights" and found it false in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405
U.S. 538, 552 (1972). The concept of "property" has been expanded by several courts
of appeals, which have recently held that the protections of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment apply to terminations of utility services for nonpayment.
See Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973). Contra, Lucas v.
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1114 (1973); Note, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process in Terminations of
Utility Services for Nonpayment, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1477 (1973).
188. See Advocate's Guide, p. 937 infra, at numbers 11, 12, 38 and 57.
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classifications that the courts will subject to close scrutiny. Most of
the classifications listed are usually thought to be forbidden by the
equal protection clause, which suggests they should not appear in this
due process guide. They are included for two reasons: due process
and equal protection questions often admittedly overlap, and when
they are held not to, the line between them is woefully unclear. One
recent example of overlapping occurred in the challenge to law school
admission practices, in which both sides relied on the equal protection
clause.189 But publication of the facts in the case led to allegations 9"
that due process was denied in the general selection process, unrelated
to the equal protection questions.
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment due process and
equal protection clauses knew that protection of the black meant
protection of the poor, since the majority of blacks were newly
emancipated from slavery. Perhaps this is the source of the lack of
clarity in decisions overturning unfair classifications based on in-
digency. I cannot clearly see the line between one of these cases
and another. In this, I seem to be following the thinking of Justice
Harlan (for due process only), Justice Douglas (for equal protection
only), and Justice Black and Chief Justice Warren (for "equal justice
under law"). Specifically, I cannot see the line between due process
and equal protection as the constitutional basis for overturning denial
of certain rights to the poor: the right to adequate appellate review,
the right to consideration of a habeas corpus petition, the right to file
for dissolution of marriage, and the right to release when time has
been served. Yet the Court has held that the first is unconstitutional
under both the equal protection and due process clauses,' 9 ' the second
under the equal protection clause only, 192 the third under the due
process clause only,'93 and the fourth under the equal protection clause
only. 1
4
Nor can I see the line the Court may be drawing between due
process and equal protection as the constitutional basis for overturning
189. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 42 U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Apr. 23, 1974).
190. Morris, Equal Protection, Affirmative Action and Racial Preferences in Law
Admissions: DeFunis v. Odegaard, 49 WASH. L. REv. 1, 7-14 (1973).
191. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (trial transcript provided without fee).
192. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (habeas corpus consideration without
paying filing fee).
193. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971) (dissolution of marriage
without paying filing fee).
194. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (release without serving further
time in lieu of paying fine).
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improper jury selection practices, included in the guide at number 22.
A black defendant complaining about the systematic exclusion of
blacks won under the equal protection clause.' 95 A white complaining
about the same kind of exclusion won under the due process clause. 196
A black, complaining about the prohibition against questioning jurors
concerning racial prejudice in order to make meaningful challenges,
won under the due process clause.' 9 7  Justice Douglas, who usually
cites equal protection rather than due process when there is a choice, 9 "
cited due process in opposing sex discrimination in jury selection, 99
while the Court, in permitting different treatment of women and men
as to state jury service, found no denial of equal protection.200
Therefore, I think the practitioner will do better if he considers
all of the classifications listed in number 48 and number 22 (race,
alienage, national origin, sex, political allegiance, and financial status),
and cites to both equal protection and due process clauses, and to the
appropriate lines of cases under each.20 '
The main sources for requirements and citations in this guide are
constitutional, public, draft, immigration, poverty, labor and criminal
law. The guide is lacking in citations to opinions, statutes and regula-
tions in other fields. Tax law, for example, should yield some useful
due process decisions, and commercial law examples should be in-
cluded.2"2 In theory, all of the cases and statutes cited by all of the
other authors in the Due Process Symposium should fit into this guide.
While the list of requirements is comprehensive, it is hoped, the
195. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
196. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
197. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
198. See note 201 infra.
199. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 636 n.3, 643 (1972) (concurring opin-
ion).
200. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
201. This conceptual problem will probably continue until society as a whole de-
cides how far it is willing or required to go in providing equality of treatment regard-
less of economic status and race. Broadly speaking, the due process advocates want
to limit the requirement of equality regardless of financial status to matters closely tied
to the judicial system (see, e.g., Harlan, J., dissenting in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 658-59 (1969)), while the equal protection advocates apparently want to
go as far with economic status as with race (see, e.g., Douglas, J., concurring in
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971)). (Is one permitted to suggest we
might do well to reconsider the scope of the privileges and immunities clause?)
202. Thomas v. United States, 386 U.S. 975 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting from
denial of writ of certiorari); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1962); United States
v. England, 347 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1965) (en banc); cf. Lenske v. United States, 383
F.2d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1967); Koontz v. United States, 277 F.2d 53, 55 (5th Cir. 1960).
See citations note 28 supra.
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citations are kept to a minimum for the sake of clarity. They often
are opinions now labeled "landmarks," and are meant to be the best
(or a good) starting place for research, not as the sole citations needed
to cover the field. Probably every case or statute cited in column
two has spawned innumerable cases, comments, and articles (easily
accessible through Shepard's Citations and the Index to Legal Period-
icals). The reader is urged to Shepardize all material in column two,
and to search out new publications to update information on this and
many other emerging areas of law.203
The only materials cited in column two are those that support,
seriously limit, or reject the requirement in column one. Finer shad-
ing must be found in textual material on the specific requirement.
An effort has been made to cite the authoritative case for each
requirement, although lawyers may differ on the best single citation
for principles such as "right to counsel. '204 United States Supreme
Court opinions are cited whenever possible. Sometimes the first case
in a string is cited, sometimes the last, the choice being made accord-
ing to the lucidity of the opinion, the extent of its historical analysis,
the significance of the fact situation from which it arose, and subjective
feelings about its style. (It would be useful for someone to add the
authoritative law review articles on each requirement and standard.)
An effort has been made to exclude recent Burger Court opinions
unless the holding is clearly contra to a previous decision. On the
one hand, including every recent decision would quickly date the
guide, and on the other hand, it takes time to sort out opinions to
find those that are sui generis and therefore will seldom or never be
used as precedent. 2 3  Recent Congressional enactments that have not
been authoritatively construed are also mentioned sparingly in this
guide. There is easy access to such opinions and statutes in any sum-
mary of recent Supreme Court and Congressional action.
Sui generis cases, however restrictive, are not included, as "con-
tra" or "but see," e.g., the cases upholding the constitutionality of the
order detaining all persons of Japanese ancestry at the outbreak of
World War Two.2 6 These will never help the advocate of due proc-
203. See publications cited in notes 151-163 supra, and in MEILEmwoHN CIVIL Li-
ERTiES INSTrrrU, HUMAN RIGmTS ORGANIZATIONS AND PURIODICALS DncToRy (A.
Ginger ed. 1973).
204. See Advocate's Guide, p. 937 infra, at numbers 11, 12, 38 and 57.
205. E.g., Russell v. United States, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Environmental Protec.
tion Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
206. Korematzu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). But see Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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ess, and it is hoped they will seldom appear in briefs by his opponent.
When they do, the lawyer must see how best to demonstrate their
unique character, and, frequently, their staleness as well.Y07
Whenever a provision in the first ten amendments has been held
to apply to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, that is recorded in the guide as follows:
Requirement Authority
Federal e.g.,Fourth Amendment
State (14th Amendment): followed
by a case in which the Court
decided to apply it
208
Citations from nonlegal sources, both from other disciplines and
from popular sayings, would be useful additions to this guide, giving
the practitioner sources that might be convincing to jurors and other
lay decision-makers.
The following abbreviations are used: admr for administrative;
APA for Administrative Procedure Act; crim for criminal; civ for civil;
fedl for federal; INS for Immigration and Naturalization Service; SSS
for Selective Service System. Denials on certiorari are not given.
207. E.g., repeal of 1954 Communist Control Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 811-826 (1970),
authorizing detention centers like those approved in cases cited note 206 supra, in Act
of Sept. 25, 1971, 85 Stat. 348 (1971).
208. For example, see Advocate's Guide, p. 937 infra, at number 3.
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DRAFT OF AN ADVOCATE'S COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS

















3. No arrest without warrant
based on probable cause
Federal
State
Except where crime committed,









U.S. CONST. art. I; 15th, 17th, 19th, 24th,
26th Amdts.
U.S. CONsT. art. I; APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553.
See state .onstitutions, administrative pro-
cedure acts, case law.
44 U.S.C. §§ 901-10 (publication of Con-
gressional Record).
Public Information Act of 1967, 5 U.S.C. §
552 (APA) (publication of admr. regula-
tions).
28 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (publication of court
opinions).
E.g., Calif: Public Records Act, CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 6250-60.
4th Amdt.
(14th Amdt): Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971); Wolf v. Colo-
rado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
But see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968)
(permitting "stop" or "seizure" short of
arrest).
18 U.S.C. §§ 3052-53.
E.g., Calif: CAL. PEN. CODE § 836.
18 U.S.C. § 3050.
E.g., People v. Pool, 27 Cal. 572, 578-79
(1865).
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BEFORE TRIAL/HEARING/APPEARANCE-(cont.)
3. No arrest without warrant based on probable cause
except where escape of suspected felon likely-(cont.)
Damage action available against
police officers for violation
of civil rights during arrest 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961).
4. No unreasonable search or
seizure
(and see # 29)
Federal 4th Amdt; Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383
(1914). But see U.S. v. Robinson, 94 S.
Ct. 467 (1973).
State (14th Amdt): Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) (permitting "stop and frisk" short
of arrest and full search). But see Gus-
tafson v. Florida, 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973)
















Charge cannot be based on
entrapment
U.S. v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972) ("domestic surveillance" intelli-
gence-gathering activities by Gov't).
See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3).
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543
(1968).
5th Amdt; Stirone v. U.S., 361 U.S. 212, 215
(1960).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74; Rabinowitz v. U.S.,
366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1968).
14th Amdt due process clause: Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959); Sherman
v. U.S., 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v.
U.S., 287 U.S. 435 (1932); Patty v. Board
of Medical Examiners, 9 Cal. 3d 356
(1973).
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Charge cannot be based
on government overreaching
Charge cannot be based on
vaguely-worded offense lacking
fair warning of prohibited
conduct
Charge cannot be based on
overbroad statute




6. Civil or administrative complaint
Cannot be based on economic or
social regulatory legislation
that precludes assumption that
it rests on some rational basis
Cannot be made by complainant
who has failed to comply with
legal obligations or duty to
negotiate (unclean hands)
Cannot deny res judicata doctrine
7. Criminal charge or civil complaint
Cannot be based on selective
enforcement of law
U.S. v. Anderson (unrep.) (D.N.J., Indict-
ment # 602-71, jury instruction: over-
reaching participation by gov't fundament-
ally unfair, offensive to basic standards of
decency, justice; Defendant's predisposi-
tions irrelevant) (5 Meiklejohn Lib Acq 17
(1973)).
1st Amdt (14th Amdt): Ashton v. Kentucky,
384 U.S. 195 (1966). 14th Amdt due
process clause: Bouie v. Columbia, 378
U.S. 347 (1964).
1st Amdt (14th Amdt): Coates v. Cincinnati,
402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967). 14th
Amdt due process clause: Cramp v. Board
of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 283-84
(1961).
5th Amdt no double jeopardy clause.
(14th Amdt): Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 794 (1969); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121, 126 (1959).
5th Amdt due process clause and art. I § 8
commerce clause: U.S. v. Carolene Pro-
ducts Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 108;
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Brother-
hood of Ry, Airline & Steamship Clks,
Freight Handlers, 437 F.2d 388, 393 (5th
Cir. 1971).
Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349
U.S. 322 (1955) (fedl civil).
14th Amdt equal protection clause: Taka-
hashi v. Fish & Game Comm'r, 334 U.S.
410 (1948) (state admr); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (state
crim).
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BEFORE TRIAL/HEARING/APPEARANCE-(cont.)
7. Criminal charge or civil complaint-(cont.)
Cannot be based on stale claims
Statutes of limitations
must be enforced
Equitable laches will be enforced
Cannot be based on charges
already litigated: collateral
estoppel will apply







Release on reasonable bail
Or on own recognizance
Without unreasonable
reporting conditions
9. Right of access to courts
(and see # 48)
Regardless of economic status
Filing fees can be waived
Federal
Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325
U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (state civ); Pender-
gast v. U.S., 317 U.S. 412 (1943) (fedl
crim); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3281-91; e.g., Calif.:
CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 799-803.
Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 287 (1940)
(fedl civ).
5th Amdt no double jeopardy clause: Hoag
v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1958)
(state crim) (denied collateral estoppel
as a constitutional guarantee); Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (fedl
habeas).
8th Amdt no excessive bail clause.
(14th Amdt): Henderson v. Dutton, 397
F.2d 375, 377 n.3 (5th Cir. 1968) (dic-
tum); Pilkinton v. Circuit Court, 324 F.2d
45, 46 (8th Cir. 1963) (dictum).
Carlisle v. Landon, 73 S. Ct. 1179, 1182
(1953) (Douglas, Cir. J.).
But see Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524
(1952).
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (crim);
FRCrP Rule 46(a)(1); Bandy v. U.S., 81
S. Ct. 197 (1960) (Douglas, Cir. J.).
Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3146.
Contra (in Dist of Col): preventive detention
provision, D.C. CODE ENCYCLOPEDIA § 23-
1322 (Supp. 1970).
U.S. v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957)
(aliens under deportation orders).
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (in forma pauperis provi-
sions).
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State
For majority group members com-
plaining about exclusion of
minority group members.
For parties with sufficient per-
sonal interest in controversy to
insure corncrete adverseness in
presenting issues
10. Right to be informed of













14th Amdt due process clause: Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (di-
vorce); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708
(1961) (habeas corpus); e.g., Ferguson
v. Keays, 4 Cal. 3d 649 (1971) (civ ap-
peal).
But see U.S. v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973)
(bankruptcy filing fees not waivable-no
denial of equal protection).
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3610: Traffi-
cante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,
409 U.S. 250 (1972) (all-white housing
development); 14th Amdt due process
clause: Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972)
(all-white jury).
APA: 5 U.S.C. § 701-02: Association of
Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970); Diggs
v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 464 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (blacks and whites denied entry into
Rhodesia challenging U.S. violation of U.N.
sanctions against Rhodesia).
6th Amdt.
(14th Amdt): In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967) (juvenile court).
5th Amdt due process clause.
14th Admt: Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14
(1950).
5th Amdt due process clause: Watkins v.
U.S., 354 U.S. 178, 208-09 (1957) (on
unAmerican activities).
"fundamental fairness": Scull v. Virginia,
359 U.S. 344 (1959) (on support for de-
segregation).
APA: 5 U.S.C. § 554.
E.g., Calif: APA, CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 11505.
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BEFORE TRIAL/HEARING/APPEARANCE-(cont.)
10. Right to be informed of nature of issue/charge: notice-(cont.)
Criminal/Legislative standards
Witness must be informed
of pertinence to subject
under inquiry
Right to prompt notice of charge
11. Right to assistance of
counsel in criminal cases




Warning of right to counsel





Even if indigent defendant
Right to effective assis-
tance of competent counsel
Right to have counsel free of
conflict of interest
Unless competently and intel-
ligently waived




Common law in criminal cases: Deutch v.
U.S., 367 U.S. 456, 468-69 (1961) (legis-
lative investigating committee).
Mallory v. U.S., 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957)
(crim arraignment must be prompt).
But see 1968 Omnibus Crime Control & Safe
Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c).
6th Amdt.
(14th Amdt): Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 53 (1932).
Westover v. U.S., 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (fedl);
Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(state).
U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
But see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)
(not necessary at pre-indictment line-up).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(state).
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(state).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 71
(1932); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444,
446 (1940); e.g., People v. Chacon, 69
Cal. 2d 765, 777 (1968).
Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942); e.g.,
People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 774
(1968).
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)
(state crim).
1st Amdt: freedom of association.
(14th Amdt): NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 431-38 (1963) (since litigation may
be a form of political action, state cannot
[Vol. 25
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Federal/State standards
Even if indigent plaintiff
Plaintiff's attorney can











14. Right to expedited procedure
to prevent infringement of
constitutional right
Federal





Of federal statutes or regulations
By injunctive action
Against enforcement or exe-
cution of fed statute
unreasonably restrict civil rights legal serv-
ice program).
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
E.g., Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-
3(b), e-5(k); Blankenship v. Boyle, 337 F.
Supp. 296 (D.D.C. 1972).
APA: 5 U.S.C. § 555(b); e.g., 8 C.F.R. H9
242.17(a), (c) (1973) (INS deportation
hearings).
FRCrP Rules 6(a), 7(f), 15, 16, 17(c).
E.g., Calif: CAL. PEN. CODE § 938.1 (grand
jury transcript to Def), 869 (preliminary
hearing transcript), 1335-36, 1349 (depo-
sitions).
FRCivP Rules 26, 33, 34, 35, 36.
E.g., Calif: CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2016
et seq.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2283; 14th Amdt due
process clause: Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479, 492 (1965) (Communist
Control Act); 1st and 14th Amdts: Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(criminal syndicalism act).
But see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971) (crim syndicalism act).
28 U.S.C. H9 2281, 2283.
28 U.S.C. § 2282; Breen v. SS Local Bd 16,
396 U.S. 460 (1970) (draft board re-
classifications); Oestereich v. SS Local 1d
11, 393 U.S. 233, 238 (1968).
But see Fein v. SS Local Bd 7, 405 U.S. 365
(1972); Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256
(1968) (conscientious objector classifica-
tion).
28 U.S.C. § 2282.
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BEFORE TRIAL/HEARING/APPEARANCE-(cont.)





By habeas corpus petition
(and see ## 17, 55)
Challenging federal custody
Challenging state custody
E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3); 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405
U.S. 538 (1972) (deprivation of property).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908) (original petition in
USSC).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
RIGHT TO HEARING/TRIAL/APPEARANCE






tant interests to which a
person is entitled
Job tenure of state college teacher
Continuation of welfare payments
No prejudgment replevin




16. Right to hearing before




Equity: no ex parte injunc-
tion in labor dispute
Administrative
No deportation without hearing
5th Amdt due process clause.
14th Amdt due process clause: Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342
(1969) (garnishment of wages).
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
But see Board of Regents of State Colleges
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
E.g., Calif: Hallinan v. Committee of Bar
Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447 (1966).
E.g., 1959 Labor-Management Reporting &
Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 411
(a) (5) (procedural rules in disciplinary ac-
tions against members of labor unions).
5th Amdt due process clause.
14th Amdt due process clause.
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101;
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Brother-
hood of Ry, Airline & Steamship Clks,
Freight Handlers, 437 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.
1971).
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590
(1953).
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No punishment by police
before trial





17. Right to hearing challenging
cause of confinement
(and see ## 14 & 55)
In federal court
Whether confined by federal
or state authorities




18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; U.S.
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (habeas corpus).
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972).
See state constitutions.




18. Right to be tried before
proper body
To remove from state to federal
court: civil, civil rights, criminal,
military cases
To change of venue
To be tried under proper law:
preemption
Federal over state law
Civil over military
State over city law





28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-43; Georgia v. Rachel,
384 U.S. 780 (1966).
But see City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384
U.S. 808 (1966).
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963)
(state crim).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 supremacy clause;
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497
(1956).
5th Amdt limited exemption clause; U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 2: O'Callahan v. Parker,
395 U.S. 258 (1969).
E.g., Calif: CAL. Gov'T CODE § 37100; Peo-
ple v. Mueller, 8 Cal. App. 3d 949 (1970)
(crim).
U.S. CoNsT. arts. I, II, m.
APA: 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557.
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33
(1950) (APA applies to INS); Immigra-
tion & Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b) (less strict than APA).
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19. Right to separation of functions: investigative, accusatorial, judicial-(cont.)
In administrative proceedings-(cont.)
In deportation hearings-(cont.)




cannot impose contempt sen-
tence at end of trial
Officer removable for cause
Federal
State
Officer removable by per-
emptory challenge
21. Right to jury trial on facts
Civil
Federal
On all legal issues











Contra, 66 Stat. 1048 (1951); Marcello v.
Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) (APA does
not apply; less strict standard acceptable).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; APA: 5 U.S.C.
§ 7521.
Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57
(1972) (city trials by admr officer when
fines benefit city); Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563, 578-79 n.2 (1968)
(state admr).
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455
(1971).
28 U.S.C. § 144 (fedl district judge); 28
U.S.C. § 455 (self-disqualification).
E.g., Calif: CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 170-
170.8 (disqualification in civ and crim
courts).
E.g., Calif: CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 170.6.
7th Amdt; FRCivP Rule 38(a); 28 U.S.C. §
2072.
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469
(1962).
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 14
(1899).
Contra, Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149
(1973).
American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S.
464, 468 (1897); FRCivP Rule 48.
FRCivP Rule 38(d).
E.g., Calif: CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 194.
E.g., Calif: CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 631.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, ci. 3; 6th Amdt;
Singer v. U.S., 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930);
FRCrP Rule 23.
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Re status as wage-earner
By challenge based on voir dire
On scruples against capital
punishment
On racial prejudice
Andres v. U.S., 333 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1948);
Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276, 288-90
(1930); see Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356, 366 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
Singer v. U.S., 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
(14th Amdt): Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968).
See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66
(1970) (serious offenses only).
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349
(1898).
Contra, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970).
Common law: see Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356, 381 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) and Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404, 414 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Contra, Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356 (1972).
28 U.S.C. § 1873.
6th, 7th Amdts; Jury Selection & Service Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69.
(14th Amdt): Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S.
363 (1966); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932).
14th Amdt equal protection clause: Swain
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965);
14th Amdt due process clause: Peters v. Kiff,
407 U.S. 493 (1972) (white crim defend-
ant may challenge exclusion of blacks
from jury).
14th Arndt equal protection clause: Her-
nandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
14th Arndt due process clause: Alexander v.
Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 634, 635 n.2
(1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); White v.
Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala.
1966) (challenging state statute denying
women right to serve on juries).
But see Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961)
(equal protection not denied).
Thiel v. Southern Pa.cific Co., 328 U.S. 217,
222 (1946).
14th Amdt due process clause: Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
14th Amdt due process clause: Ham v. South





22. Right to jurors selected impartially-(cont.)
Federal/State standards
By challenge based on voir dire-(cont.)
On lifestyle prejudice
Voir dire conducted by lawyers
Federal
State



















Fair hearing must be
actually provided
Hearing must be provided
that appears fair to litigant
U.S. v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 369 (7th Cir.
1972).
But see Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S.
524, 527-28 (1973).
FRCivP Rule 47(a); FRCrP 24(a) (in dis-
cretion of judge).
E.g., Calif: CAL. PEN. CODE § 1078.
But see, e.g., Calif. Rules of Sup. Ct., Rules
228 and 516 (civ); State v. Crowe, 8
Cal. 3d 815 (1973) (crim).
FRCrP Rule 24(b).
See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220-22
(1965).
E.g., Calif: CAL. PEN. CODE H9 1069-70,
1088.
28 U.S.C. § 1870; FRCivP Rule 47(b).
E.g., Calif: CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 601.
28 U.S.C. §H 1866(c)(2), (4); see FRCrP
Rule 242.
E.g., Calif: CAL. PEN. CODE H9 1071-87.
28 U.S.C. § 1870.
E.g., Calif: CAL. CoDE CIV. PROC. 99 602-03.
5th Amdt due process clause.
14th Amdt due process clause.
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)
(state, crim contempt); Iowa Central RR
Co. v. Iowa, 160 U.S. 389, 393 (1896)
(state, mandamus); Davidson v. New
Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1877) (state
eminent domain).
Offutt v. U.S., 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (fedl
summary contempt of atty); Communist
Party of United States v. Subversive Activi-
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ties Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 124
(1956) (fedl admr); Berger v. U.S., 255
U.S. 22, 35 (1921) (disqualification of
judge, fedl crim).




must be done in public
25. Right to speedy trial
Federal
State
26. Hearing must be regulated
by officer





To prevent influence on jurors
To insure impartial atmosphere
27. Prosecutor has a duty
(in criminal cases)
To introduce all material evi-
dence to jury
Not to introduce false testimony
Not to seek to convict but
to see that justice is done
28. Parties may introduce evidence
Oral or documentary
29. Gov't may not introduce
evidence obtained by unreasonable
search or seizure




(14th Amdt): In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948).
E.g., Calif.: Brown Act, CAL. Gov'T CoDE §
54950 et seq (covering legislative and
administrative agencies, councils, boards).
6th Amdt.
(14th Amdt): Klopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213 (1967).
U.S. CONST. art. III.
APA: 5 U.S.C. § 556.
Due process: Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333, 363 (1966).
Due process: Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
466, 473-74 (1965).
APA: 5 U.S.C. § 556.
Due process clause: Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S.
150 (1972) (re promise of immunity to
witness); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963) (prosecutor's good or bad faith
in suppressing material evidence irrelevant).
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (re
promise of consideration to witness).
Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
Common law; APA: 5 U.S.C. § 556.
4th Amdt; Elkins v. U.S., 364 U.S. 206
(1960).
(14th Amdt): Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
But see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
(stop and frisk may be valid).
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29. Gov't may not introduce evidence obtained by
unreasonable search or seizure-(cont.)
Federal/State standards
Nor obtained by electronic
surveillance without prior
judicial approval Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967); 18
U.S.C. § 2515; 47 U.S.C. § 605; Gelbard
v. U.S., 408 U.S. 41 (1972); U.S. v. U.S.
District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (fed]
grand jury contempt).
But see Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20, 3504.
Participant in conversation and
owner of premises searched
have standing to object to use
of fruits of search Alderman v. U.S., 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
Def has right to inspect Govt's
surveillance materials to
ascertain portions relevant to
Govt's evidence against Def Alderman v. U.S., 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
30. Gov't may not introduce evidence








31. Gov't may not introduce evidence
Obtained by voluntary confession
Made after delay in arraignment
Made after custodial interrogation
without adequate warnings
Or obtained by compelled incrim-
inating testimony
Immunity must provide com-
plete, transactional protection
5th Amdt privilege against self-incrimination:
Symons v. U.S., 178 F.2d 615 (9th Cir.
1950).
(14th Amdt): Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964) (state crim contempt); Black-
burn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960)
(state crim).
18 U.S.C. § 3501(a); Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964).
FRCrP 5(a): Mallory v. U.S., 354 U.S. 449
(1957) (fedl crim).
But see 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b), (c).
5th Amdt privilege against self-incrimination:
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
But see 18 U.S.C. § 3501; Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (may be
admissible for impeachment purposes in
absence of warnings).
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892) (fedl grand jury contempt).
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32. Prosecutor may not comment on
Def's failure to testify
Def need not testify first
for defense
33. Right to hearing
On Def's competence to stand trial















Defendant [to confront opposing Ws]
Criminal
Contra, Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05; Zicarelli v.
New Jersey State Comm. of Investigation,
406 U.S. 472 (1972) (state); Kastigar v.
U.S., 406 U.S. 441 (fedl).
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52, 78-79 (1964) (state admr contempt).
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514, 516
(1967) (to attorneys); Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (to
police officers).
Marchetti v. U.S., 390 U.S. 39, 48, 60
(1968) (fedl registration of wagering oc-
cupation); Albertson v. Subversive Ac-
tivities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 78
(1965) (fedl admr "Communist" registra-
tion).
5th Amdt (14th Amdt) privilege against
self-incrimination: Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
14th Amdt due process clause: Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966) (fedl
habeas).
6th Amdt.
(14th Amdt): Washington v. Texas, 385
U.S. 14 (1967).
FRCivP Rule 45 (a), (e)(1)(2).
E.g., Calif: CAL. CoDE CIV. PRoc. § 1989.
APA: 5 U.S.C. § 555.
Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S.
76, 81 (1919) (fedl).
APA: 5 U.S.C. § 566(b).
6th Amdt (14th Amdt): Shields v. U.S.,
273 U.S. 583 (1927); Hopt v. Utah, 110
U.S. 574 (1884).
Contra, Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970).
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36. Right to confrontation of
adverse witnesses
Federal
Def has right to see pretrial
statements of Gov't witnesses
State




38. Right to assistance of counsel
(and see ## 11, 57)
Criminal standards
Of own choosing
Free of violations of
attorney-client privilege
Administrative standards
Sometimes even if indigent
39. Right of parties to under-
stand proceedings
Through use of interpreter if necessary
40. Right to no prejudicial publicity
during trial
6th Amdt; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (admr: aliens
in deportation hearings); Bruton v. U.S.,
391 U.S. 123 (1968) (fedl crim).
Cf. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970)
(hearsay allowed) (fedl habeas of state
crim).
Jencks v. U.S., 353 U.S. 657 (1957) (crim).
But see Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
(14th Amdt): Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 415 (1965) (state crim); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (crim).
6th Amdt; Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123
(1968) (crim); INS: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)
(admr).
(14th Amdt): Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965) (crim); e.g., Fahey v. Clark,
125 Conn. 44 (1938).
6th Amdt (14th Amdt).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932)
(state crim); Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d
1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970) (state crim).
But see, e.g., Drumgo v. Superior Court, 8
Cal. 3d 930 (1973) (state crim).
Coplon v. U.S., 191 F.2d 749, 757-59 (D.C.
Cir. 1951) (wiretap of conversations).
APA: 5 U.S.C. § 555; e.g., U.S. v. Weller,
309 F. Supp. 50, 55 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (see
n.63 supra).
Adkins v. DuPont Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342
(1948); In re American Chinchilla Corp..
76 F.T.C. 1016, 1037 (1969).
See FRCivP Rule 43(f); FRCrP Rule 28(b);
Retana v. Apartment Operators Union
Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972)
(Spanish-speaking union members statu-
tory right to fair representation violated
by failure to provide bilingual liaison).
5th Amdt due process clause: Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (fedl habeas
challenging state crim conviction).
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But no unreasonable limits on
comments by parties and attorneys
before and during trial (gag rules)
41. Right to require body to




Rules may be tempered to
achieve purpose when no
substantial prejudice results
42. Right to transcript of
trial or hearing
(and see # 56)
Administrative
U.S. v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.
1972); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059,
1061 (7th Cir. 1970); Craig v. Harney,
331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947).
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372 (1957)
(fedl loyalty-security); due process: Bridges
v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 125, 135 (1945) (fedl
deportation).
Gojack v. U.S., 384 U.S. 702, 708-09 (1966);
Yellin v. U.S., 374 U.S. 109, 114 (1963)
(fedl contempt of House Comm. on Un-
American Activities).
Schacht v. U.S., 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (late
filing under Rules of USSC).
APA: 5 U.S.C. § 556.
BASIS OF DECISION/CLASSIFICATION
43. No conviction of offense not
charged
44. Every element of crime in
complaint must be proved
Valid administrative order is
element in criminal charge for
failure to obey order
45. Presumptions
Legislative
Must be rational connec-
tion between fact proved
and ultimate fact presumed
5th Andt right to grand jury indictment:
Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112
(1969); Stirone v. U.S., 361 U.S. 212, 215
(1960).
Davis v. U.S., 160 U.S. 469, 493 (1895).
U.S. v. England, 347 F.2d 425 (7tb Cir.
1965) (failure/refusal to pay tax computed
by IRS); U.S. v. Bowles, 331 F.2d 742
(3d Cir. 1964) (valid deportation order
element of crim offense of re-entry after
deportation); Koontz v. U.S., 277 F.2d
53, 55 (5th Cir. 1960) (Def must be per-
mitted to prove tax assessment not valid).
5th, 14th Amdt due process clauses: Tot v.
U.S., 319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943).




No presumption of adminis-
trative regularity U.S. ex rel Johnson v. Shaughnessy, 336 U.S.
806 (1949) (INS must prove it complied
with its own regulations in exclusion case);
Eastern-Central Motor Carriers Associa-
tion v. U.S., 321 U.S. 194 (1944) (ICC
must prove validity of its method of
computing shipping rates).
Presumption of administrative
regularity requires judicial review
of admr order on civil side Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414, 418-19 (1944)
(re Emergency Court of App on price
controls).
Contra, SSS: 1967 Selective Service Act
amdt, § 8(c): 50 USC App. § 460(b)(3).
46. Right to decision based
on evidence
(and see ## 28-32)
Appearing in record only APA: 5 U.S.C. § 556; Collette Travel
Service, Inc. v. U.S., 263 F. Supp. 302
(D.R.I. 1966).
Including transcripts and exhibits APA: 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57.
Communications between jurors
and others prohibited Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
Jury verdicts reversible if
based on quotient or chance U.S. v. 4925 Acres of Land, 143 F.2d 127,
128 (5th Cir. 1944) (condemnation); e.g.,
Calif: CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 657(2)
(chance verdicts).
Some evidence necessary to
support verdict Due process: Thompson v. Louisville, 362
U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (city crim).
Cannot be based on false evidence Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (state
crim); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,
112 (1935) (state crim).
Cannot be based on perjured testimony Mesarosh v. U.S., 352 U.S. 1 (1956) (fedl
crim).
47. Evidence of intent or
notice necessary
Criminal
Criminal intent necessary (in 1st Amdt context): Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959); Dennis v. U.S.,
341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951).
Specific intent cannot be presumed U.S. ex rel. Vraniak v. Randolph, 261 F.2d
234, 237 (7th Cir. 1958).
Administrative
Notice or knowledge of regulation
is element when requirement
becomes basis for criminal charge Due process: Lambert v. California, 355 U.S.
225 (1957) (ordinance requiring registra-
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48. Inherently suspect classifications
subject to close judicial scrutiny
Based on race
Based on alienage
Based on national origin
Based on sex
Based on political allegiance
Based on poverty
Limiting right to vote
Denying right to hearing
before property confiscated
Limiting right to file civil suits
Defeating possibility of
representative trial jury
Limiting right to counsel
In civil cases
In criminal cases
tion of felons); Flannagan v. U.S., 145
F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1944) (crim)
(price control violation).
14th Amdt equal protection clause:
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)
(state anti-miscegenation act); McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964)
(state crim re inter-racial couples).
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72
(1971) (fedl welfare benefits).
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46
(1948) (state law prohibiting alien from
holding land unconstitutional).
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(plurality opinion) (automatic fedl dis-
crimination against servicewoman).
See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)
(see note 201 infra).
24th Amdt; 14th Amdt equal protection
clause: Harper v. Virginia Bd of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (unconstitu-
tionality of state poll tax).
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (re-
possession of household goods before
hearing unconstitutional); Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969) (garnishment of wages unconsti-
tutional).
14th Amdt due process clause: Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (un-
constitutionality of filing fee requirement
for marriage dissolution); Smith v. Bennett,
365 U.S. 708 (1961) (unconstitutionality
of refusal to consider habeas corpus petition
unless filing fee paid).
Thiel v. Southern Pacific, 328 U.S. 217, 222
(1946) (automatic exclusion of wage-
earners forbidden).
See 1st Amdt (14th Amdt): NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
14th Amdt due process and equal protection
clauses: Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967) (on appeal); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (at trial level).
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BASIS OF DECISION/CLASSIFICATION-(cont.)
48. Inherently suspect classifications subject to close judicial scrutiny-(cont.)
Based on Poverty-(cont.)





49. Burden of proof
On proponent








Beyond a reasonable doubt
Juvenile (crim)
Beyond a reasonable doubt




Parties submit proposed instructions
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (in forma pauperis
provisions): Adkins v. I. I. DuPont
deNemours & Co., 355 U.S. 331, 342
(1948).
14th Amdt equal protection: Tate v. Short,
401 U.S. 395 (1971) (city traffic); Wil-
liams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (state
crim).
14th Amdt due process and equal protection
clauses: Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
19-20 (1956) (state crim).
Common law; APA: 5 U.S.C. § 556(c).
See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303
U.S. 161 (1938).
APA: 5 U.S.C. § 557.
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966)
(deportation akin to punishment).
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 368 (1970).
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970)
(during adjudicatory stage when charged
with act that would constitute crime if
committed by adult).
APA: 5 U.S.C. § 557.
FRCivP Rule 51; FRCrP Rule 30.
DECISION/ORDER/CLASSIFICATION/SANCTION/BENEFIT]SENTENCE
52. Must give findings, reasons,
conclusions
Criminal
For determination whether con-
viction based on constitutional
portion of statute
Administrative
See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S.
87, 92 (1965) (state non-jury); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 665 (1963)
(state jury).
APA: 5 U.S.C. § 557(c); In re United
Corp., 249 F.2d 168, 179 (3d Cir. 1957).
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No sanction outside authority
No penalty for exercise of con-
stitutional or statutory rights
No punishment for status
No confinement to work
off fines due to indigency
Right of convicted criminal (held
after sentence completed) to hearing
No bills of attainder
Federal
State
No punishment ex post facto
Federal
State





APA: 5 U.S.C. § 555(e).
APA: 5 U.S.C. § 558(b); statutory con-
struction of draft law: Breen v. SS Local
Bd. 16, 396 U.S. 460, 464-66 (1970);
Oestereich v. SS Local Bd 11, 393 U.S.
233, 237-38 (1968).
1st Amdt; 5th Amdt due process clause:
Habib v. Edwards, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (fedl civ--complaint re housing
violations); NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (4);
NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972)
(fedl admr).
8th Amdt (14th Amdt): Robinson v. Calif-
ornia, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (would
be cruel and unusual punishment).
14th Amdt equal protection clause: Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (city traffic);
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970)
(state crim).
McNeil v. Director, Pauxent Institution, 407
U.S. 245 (1972) (held for treatment under
state indefinite commitment procedure).
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. v. Brown,
381 U.S. 437, 440 (1965) (fedl crim);
U.S. v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-16
(1946) (fedl civ).
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
But see deportation charges: 1952 Immigra-
tion and Nationality Law, 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(11) (fedl admr).
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
8th Amdt.
(14th Amdt): Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (state crime to be
narcotics addict); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972) (state capital punishment).
E.g., Calif: CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 6 (no
cruel or unusual punishment).
FRCrP Rule 11: Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257 (1971) (state crim); Brady
v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (guilty
plea can be attacked) (fedl crim).




No heavier sentence on retrial
without stating reasons
Punishment abated where appropriate
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
(1969). But see Colten v. Kentucky, 407
U.S. 104 (1972).
Common law: Hamm v. City of Rock Hill,
379 U.S. 306, 308 (1964) (city crim-civil
rights); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226,
230 (1964) (state crim-civil rights).
REVIEW OF DECISION/CLASSIFICATION/SANCTION
54. Right to appeal
By party suffering legal wrong




55. Right to collateral attack
(and see ## 14, 17)
56. Right to adequate record on appeal
(and see # 42)
Sometimes even if indigent
57. Right to appear by counsel
(and see ## 11, 38)
Sometimes even if indigent
Federal
State
Assigned counsel must function
actively as advocate
58. Interim relief possible




Scope of review depends on
whether trial body followed
the law
U.S. CONST. art. III.
APA: 5 U.S.C. § 702.
14th Arndt due process clause: Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-61 (1970).
28 U.S.C. § 1915.
E.g., Calif: Ferguson v. Keays, 4 Cal. 3d
649 (1971) (civ nonstatutory).
U.S. CoNST. art I, § 9 habeas corpus.
14th Arndt due process and equal protection
clauses: Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748,
751 (1967) (state crim); Griffin v. Illi-
nois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956).
14th Amdt equal protection clause: Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963)
(state crim).
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744
(1967) (state crim).
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. §
3006A(c), (d), (g); FRCrP Rule 44(a).
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
Ellis v. U.S., 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958) (fedl
crim).
APA: 5 U.S.C. § 705.
U.S. CONST. art. III.
APA: 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706.
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966)
(fedl admr).
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No appeal from jury verdict
on the facts (unless complete
absence of probative facts)
60. Appellate decision must be
based on law
7th Amdt: Bashm v. Pennsylvania RR Co.,
372 U.S. 699, 700-01 (1963); Atlantic &
Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines,
Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 359 (1962); Lavender
v. Kum, 327 U.S. 645, 652-53 (1946).
Contra (limited), Hill v. McKeithen, 345 F.
Supp. 1025 (E.D. La.), affd sub nom.
Mayes v. Ellis, 409 U.S. 943 (1972)
(Louisiana state civ case under civil law
tradition).
APA: 5 U.S.C. § 706.
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Is Due Process Worth Three Credits?
This guide, however inadequate, indicates that due process is a
significant, useful area of law deserving study independent of substan-
tive areas. Warren Court opinions on due process in criminal cases
became so numerous that many law schools split their Criminal Law
courses in two, took most due process out of Constitutional Law, and
started a new semester course on Criminal Procedure. Meanwhile,
professors found themselves compelled to insert references to these
criminal law due process decisions in their Administrative Law
classes.
209
Any attention to due process questions in the law school curricu-
lum is welcomed by the practitioner seeking a clerk prepared for liti-
gation. However, these developments also had a negative side.
When most consideration of due process is pushed into a course en-
titled Criminal Procedure, the universality of the concept is de-empha-
sized. The student specializing in tax or commercial law may not
learn to spot every due process issue or to use it when appropriate.
While preparing this article, I began teaching on a trial basis a
seminar on due process to third year students at the University of San
Francisco School of Law, considering due process as it applies across
the board and historically. In addition, each student was required to
obtain a clinical placement with some court or agency where he or
she could: obtain a copy of the rules, manual for employees, or other
list of standard operating procedures; attend fact-finding and decision-
making sessions of the agency or court; participate in at least one case;
and draft a decision, report, summary, complaint, or other document
similar to one used in the agency or court. The students found place-
ments in a wide variety of judicial, military, enforcement, and adminis-
trative agencies and indicated that the combination of class discussion
and clinical work made due process very real to them.
Perhaps as other courses on due process are established, we can
also improve the definition of due process and solve some of the in-
triguing questions this article had to bypass. Perhaps we can also an-
alyze more quickly and testify more often on pending legislation affect-
ing due process.210
209. See generally K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE iii-xiii (1970 Supp.),
210. See, for example, concern about due process denials drafted into the proposed
Criminal Code Reform Act of 1973, S. 1400 and H.R. 6046, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), expressed by the National Committee Against Repressive Legislation, P.O. Box
74757, Los Angeles, Cal. 90004, in L OPEN FORUM, No. 11, at 2 (Nov. 1973) (pub-
lished by American Civil Liberties Union, Southern California).
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Meanwhile, we can accept the immediate, daily challenge facing
laymen and lawyers alike in the current constitutional crisis. Lawyers
will affect the mood of the whole country by their public attitude con-
cerning due process. Lawyers showing increased concern about fair-
ness will be applauded by many laymen who have begun to see the
importance of due process in all government procedures. The Water-
gate and impeachment investigations have given the legal profession
an unusual opportunity to demonstrate that legalisms like "due proc-
ess" are not empty phrases, but can actually help provide a govern-
ment determined to do "whatever's fair."

